Grand Trunk Railroad Company v. Richardson et al.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

74 federal appellate · 8 district · 168 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 285 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[W]hile it must be admit[t]ed that a railroad company has the exclusive control of all the land within the lines of its roadway, and is not at liberty to alienate any part of it so as to interfere with the full exercise of the franchises granted, we are not prepared to assert that it may not license the erection of buildings for its convenience, even though they may be also for the convenience of others. It is not doubted that the [railroad] might have erected similar structures on the ground on which the plaintiffs’ buildings were placed, if in its judgment the structures were convenient for the receipt and delivery of freight on its road. Such erections would not have been inconsistent with the purposes for which its charter was granted. And, if the company might have put up the buildings, why might it not license others to do the same thing for the same object; namely, the increase of its facilities for the receipt and delivery of freight? The public is not injured, and it has no right to complain, so long as a free and safe passage is left for the carriage of freight and passengers.”

   8 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Townsend · Barahona v. Union Pacific Railroad

2. ““Tlie plaintiffs were allowed'to prove, notwithstanding objection by the defendant, that, at various times during the same summer before the fire occurred some of the defendant’s locomotives scattered fire when going past the mill and bridge, without showing that either of those which the plaintiffs claimed communicated the fire was among the number, and without showing that the locomotives were similar in their make, their state of repair, or management, to those claimed to have caused the fire complained of. The evidence was admitted after the defendant’s case had closed. But, .whether it was strictly rebutting or not, if it tended to prove the plaintiffs’ case, its admission as rebutting was within the discretion of the court below, and not reviewable here. The question, therefore, is whether it tended in any degree to show that the burning of the bridge, and the consequent destruction of the plaintiffs’ property, were caused by any of the defendant’s locomotives. The question has often been considered by the courts in this country and in England; and such evidence has, we think, been generally held admissible, as tending to prove the possibility, and a consequent probability, that some locomotive caused the fire, and as tending to show a negligent habit of the officers and agents of the railroad company. Piggot v. R. R. Co., 3 M. G. & S. 229; Sheldon v. R. R. Co., 14 N. Y. 218 [ 67 Am. Dec. 155 ]; Field v. R. R. Co., 32 N. Y. 339 ; Webb v. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 420 [ 10 Am.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mentzer · Kress v. Markline

3. ““In this case it was proved that engines run by the defendant had crossed the bridge not long before it took fire. The particular engines were not identified ; but their crossing raised at least some probability, in the absence of proof of any other known cause, that they caused the fire; and it seems to us, that, under the circumstances, this probability was strengthened by the fact that some engines of the same defendant, at other times during the same season, had scattered fire during their passage.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Sprague v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.