United States v. Walker’s Empirical Analysis
1995
Citation profile
7 federal appellate · 13 district · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 42 later decisions — most recently January 2013 · most notably United States v. Tucker (1996), State v. Chew (1997)
7 federal appellate · 13 district · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1958 · 18 U.S.C. § 2 · 18 U.S.C. § 3432 · 18 U.S.C. § 3592 · 18 U.S.C. § 922 (Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 924 · 21 U.S.C. § 801 (§ 101 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 841 (§ 401 of the Controlled Substances Act)
Relies on United States v. Mendenhall · Gregg v. Georgia · Furman v. Georgia · Lockett v. Ohio · United States v. Lopez
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“... the court of appeals shall consider the record, the evidence submitted during the trial, the information submitted during the sentencing hearing, the procedures employed in the sentencing hearing, and the special findings returned under this section. ... The court shall affirm the sentence if it determines that— (A) the sentence of death was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and (B) the information supports the special finding of the existence of every aggravating factor upon which the sentence was based, together with, or the failure to find, any mitigating factors as set forth or allowed in this section”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“The Court first notes that § 848(n)(7) has two prongs: that the offense was committed “as consideration for the receipt” or “in expectation of the receipt” of something of pecuniary value. Defendants’ view seems correct that the first prong’s use of the “as consideration for” language of contract contemplates murder-for-hire. 4 For this Court to transport that restriction to the second, “in expectation of the receipt,” prong, however, would render the second clause mere surplusage. 5”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent“expressly transports the language of contract to both its prongs.... There is no dispute that § 1958 speaks only to murder-for-hire.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.