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← 912 F.2d 534 - United States v. Oshatz

United States v. Oshatz’s Empirical Analysis

912 F.2d 534 · 1990

Citation profile

61
cited by 61 later decisions
3
states following
September 2024
most recently cited

39 federal appellate · 2 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 61 later decisions — most recently September 2024 · most notably Miller v. Gammie (2003), United States v. Johnson (2001)

39 federal appellate · 2 district · 3 state decisions

4101990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 371 · 26 U.S.C. § 7206

Relies on Huddleston v. United States · Michelson v. United States · Bullock v. United States · Houltin v. United States · Welsh II v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 61 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[t]hough ... a 'repo to maturity' repurchase agreement, is legal, it provides no basis for claiming an interest expense deduction since no profit or loss can be realized in connection with the interest charges.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “A jury evaluating the testimony of an opinion witness ... must determine two things: how well the witness knows the defendant, and by what standard the witness judges the defendant. Both are essential in order for the jury to weigh the testimony. If the witness does not know the defendant well, it is unlikely the witness will have seen enough of the defendant’s behavior to judge his character. If the witness’ judgment is distorted either by such partisanship that the witness would think highly of the defendant despite misbehavior, or by a warped ethical standard, the witness’ opinion may be correspondingly discounted. A strong enough partisan would swear truthfully that the defendant is a person of good character even if he has committed the crime on trial; a witness who thinks the crime on trial is not inconsistent with good character would do the same. The question at issue in this case probes both the witness’ bias and the witness’ own standards by asking whether the witness would retain a favorable opinion of the defendant even if the evidence at trial proved guilt.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “to some extent a guilt-assuming hypothetical question might be probative of the credibility of testimony given by a non-expert character witness. Steadfast adherence to a favorable opinion by a witness asked to assume the defendant’s guilt might provide some basis for concluding that the witness is simply supporting the defendant, rather than providing credible testimony about his character. But we share the view of [an earlier Second Circuit panel] that such cross-examination is nevertheless to be prohibited because it creates too great a risk of impairing the presumption of innocence. Moreover, ... the jury might infer from the judge’s permission to ask a guilt-based hypothetical question that the prosecutor has evidence of guilt beyond the evidence in the record.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.