Harrison v. Harrison’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(2)(A) All real and personal property owned by a spouse before marriage ...; (B) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage; (C) Income from and appreciation of property owned by a spouse before marriage except when characterized as marital property under subdivision (b)(1); (D) Property acquired by a spouse at any time by gift, bequest, devise or descent. ...”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Keyt v. Keyt · Langschmidt v. Langschmidt

2. ““Marital property” includes income from, and any increase in value during the marriage, of property determined to be separate property in accordance with subdivision (b)(2) if each party substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation and the value of vested pension, retirement or other fringe benefit rights accrued during the period of the marriage.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Garfinkel v. Garfinkel · Snodgrass v. Snodgrass

3. “The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in thus dividing the marital property of the parties and, accordingly, set that division aside and made its own division of marital property. The Court of Appeals held that the full appreciation in value of the big house during the marriage of $51,700 was not to be considered as marital prop erty, but that only $7,455 of that appreciation should be considered as .marital property, that being the sum that the husband had expended on improvements and repairs on the big house property during the marriage. The court held “that the major portion of the increase in price of the big house was due primarily to the substantial increase in the value of inflation that took place during that time and, therefore, would not be considered marital property but instead would be treated as the separate property of the wife.” In our opinion, the Court of Appeals in so concluding, erred since the statute, T.C.A. § 36-4 — 121(b)(1) clearly states that “any increase in value during the marriage” of such property shall be included as marital property subject to division. The word “any” is all inclusive and does not allow an exception based on inflation, as held by the Court of Appeals. The only condition imposed in the statute for treating any increase in value during the marriage as marital property is the provision, “if each party substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation.” This condition was amply ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Denton v. Denton