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← 913 FSUPP 1421 - Ramirez v. IBP, Inc.

Ramirez v. IBP, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

1995

Citation profile

19
cited by 19 later decisions
1
states following
June 2005
most recently cited

4 federal appellate · 14 district · 1 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H · Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation · St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks · Oklahoma v. New Mexico

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The Kansas Supreme Court makes unmistakably clear in Ortega that retaliatory discharge is a tort committed only when the employer discharges the employee for an improper reason. The court admits the actual language found in Coleman readily submits to an interpretation that an employer, regardless of knowledge or intent, may not discharge an employee for absences caused by job-related injuries. To accept unconditionally this interpretation would contradict the raison d’etre for this tort. From Murphy to Coleman to most recently in' Ortega , the Kansas appellate courts have stressed that this tort exception to the employment-at-will doctrine was developed to address employers’ improper motives for firing employees in violation of public policy. The mere act of firing an injured employee for excessive absences or for a violation of a absenteeism policy does not implicate an improper retaliatory motive, particularly when the employer does not even know that one or more of the absences were due to work-related injuries. Consistent with Gaddy and Mitchell, the court holds that the plaintiff may not recover for retaliatory discharge unless she proves that at the time of her discharge the defendant knew or should have known the absences for which the plaintiff was being fired were the result of her work-related injury. This leaves the question whether the plaintiff must prove a retaliatory intent or causal nexus and, if so, what must be proved. Again, the court simply does not believ”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “by a preponderance of evidence, but the evidence must be clear and convincing in nature.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “In this case, it was undisputed that Safeway could have terminated Coleman’s employment under the applicable attendance policy if she had accrued six infractions. The district court [on a summary judgment motion] correctly decided that any absences caused by her work-related injury should not be counted against Coleman. Allowing an employer to discharge an employee for being absent or failing to call in an anticipated absence as the result of a work-related injury would allow an employer to indirectly fire an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim, a practice contrary to the public policy of this state as decided in Murphy v. City of Topeka. Other jurisdictions have also recognized that it is a violation of public policy and workers’ compensation law to discharge an employee for absences due to work-related injuries. See, e.g., Lo Dolce v. Regional Transit Service, Inc., 77 A.D.2d 697 , 429 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1980) [disapproved of by Duncan v. New York State Developmental Center, 63 N.Y.2d 128 , 470 N.E.2d 820 , 481 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1984)]. Safeway’s claim that Coleman was not discharged for absences, but for failing to call in to report absences, is not persuasive given the fact that Coleman was being treated by a company’s physician who provided reports to Safeway regarding Coleman’s condition.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.