United States v. Clutter’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

26 federal appellate · 2 district · 14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 63 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[A] consent search is fundamentally different in nature from the waiver of a trial right ... [Wjhen the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but may show the permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other significant relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected. Id. at 171 , 94 S.Ct. at 993 . Common authority is, of course, not to be implied from the mere property interest a third-party has in the property. The authority which justifies the third-party consent does not rest upon the law of property, with its attendant and historical and legal refinements, ... but rests rather on the mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-habitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that others have assumed the risk that one of their number may permit the common area to be searched. Id. at 171, n. 7 , 94 S.Ct. at 993 n. 7.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 194 N.C. App. 594 - State v. Early · 75 Cal. App. 4th 406 - People v. Hoxter

2. “As a general consideration, there is every reason to assume that mature family members possesses the authority to admit police to look about the family residence, since in the common experience family members have the run of the house. So, in that sense, absent special circumstances, all rooms in the residence can be said to be areas of usage common to all members of the family. It is, of course, conceivable that family members will exclude from this common authority access to areas where they wish to maintain an expectation of privacy, even from other family members. Accordingly, courts are understandably reluctant to approve third party consent searches of an enclosed space in which a family member targeted for the search has clearly manifested in expectation of exclusivity. Id. at 777-78 . [Emphasis added].”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Cork · 29 F. Supp. 2d 411 - United States v. Barkovitz

3. “In addition, while the judge who issued the search warrant might have been misled into believing that Spaw and the confidential informant were two different persons, that misconception would not have been crucial to establishing probable cause. Defendants have not pointed to any facts recited in the affidavit relating to probable cause that are false. Accordingly, when one views the motivation of the police officers in drafting the affidavit in the form presented [to protect the informant], it cannot be said that they acted to deceive the judge as to the existence of probable cause.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Fox