914 So. 2d 372 - Minor v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

32 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Minor also argues that Dr. Hardin's testimony was not proper rebuttal because, he says, it was not competent evidence. According to Minor, `Dr. Hardin's testimony could not be considered competent evidence because it did not meet the requirements for expert scientific testimony set out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).' (Minor's brief at p. 21.) Minor maintains that `Dr. Hardin's theory of rapidly dropping hematocrit' has never been subject to peer review or publication and is not generally accepted in the scientific community and thus was not admissible scientific evidence. (Minor's brief at p. 14.) "Initially, we point out that Minor's reliance on Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), is misplaced because the Daubert standard for admissibility of scientific evidence applies by statute in Alabama only to DNA evidence. See § 36-18-30, Ala.Code 1975; Bagley v. Mazda Motor Corp., 864 So.2d 301, 310 (Ala.2003); Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Washington, 774 So.2d 505 , 516 n. 5 (Ala. 2000); and Turner v. State, 746 So.2d 355 (Ala.1998). In Alabama, the standard for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence other than DNA evidence is that set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). See Turner, 746 So.2d at 361 n. 7 (`With respect to expert scientific testimony on subjects other than DNA techniques governed by § 36-18-30, Frye remains the standard of admissibility in Alabama.'). "That ”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Mazda Motor Corp. v. Hurst · 999 So. 2d 508 - Millry Mill Co. v. Manuel

2. “"`"`During closing argument, the prosecutor, as well as defense counsel, has a right to present his impressions from the evidence, if reasonable, and may argue every legitimate inference.'" Reeves v. State , 807 So.2d 18 , 45 (Ala.Crim.App. 2000), quoting Rutledge v. State , 523 So.2d 1087 , 1100 (Ala.Crim.App. 1987) (citation omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 523 So.2d 1118 (Ala. 1988). "`"`The test of a prosecutor's legitimate argument is that whatever is based on facts and evidence is within the scope of proper comment and argument. Kirkland v. State , 340 So.2d 1139 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 340 So.2d 1140 (Ala. 1976 [1977]). Statements based on facts admissible in evidence are proper. Henley v. State , 361 So.2d 1148 *Page 1232 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 361 So.2d 1152 (Ala. 1978). A prosecutor as well as defense counsel has a right to present his impressions from the evidence. He may argue every legitimate inference from the evidence and may examine, collate, sift, and treat the evidence in his own way. Williams v. State , 377 So.2d 634 (Ala.Crim.App. 1979); McQueen v. State , 355 So.2d 407 (Ala.Crim.App. 1978).'" "` Ballard v. State , 767 So.2d 1123 , 1135 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999), writ quashed, 767 So.2d 1142 (Ala. 2000), quoting Watson v. State , 398 So.2d 320 , 328 (Ala.Crim.App. 1980), cert. denied, 398 So.2d 332 (Ala.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 , 101 S.Ct. 3085 , 69 L.Ed.2d 955 (1981).' " Johnson v. State , 823 So.2d 1 , 47 (Ala.Crim.App. 2001)."”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Johnson v. State · 919 So. 2d 1223 - Banks v. State

3. ““ ‘in judging a prosecutor’s closing argument, the standard is whether the argument “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a ,denial of due process.” ’ Bankhead [v. State], 585 So.2d [97,] 107 [(Ala.Crim.App.1989),] quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 , 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2471 , 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 , 94 S.Ct. 1868 , 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974)). ‘A prosecutor’s statement must be viewed in the context of all of the evidence presented and in the context of the complete closing arguments to the jury.’ Roberts v. State, 735 So.2d 1244, 1253 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), aff'd, 735 So.2d 1270 (Ala.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 939 , 120 S.Ct. 346 , 145 L.Ed.2d 271 (1999). Moreover, ‘statements of counsel in argument to the jury must be viewed as delivered in the heat of debate; such statements are usually valued by the jury at their true worth and are not expected to become factors in the formation of the verdict.’ Bank-head, 585 So.2d at 106. ‘Questions of the propriety of argument of counsel are largely within the trial court’s discretion, McCullough v. State, 357 So.2d 397, 399 (Ala.Crim.App.1978), and that court is given broad discretion- in determining what is permissible argument.’ Bankhead, 585 So.2d at 105.' We will not reverse the judgment of the trial court unless there has been an abuse of that discretioh. Id.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. White v. State · McCray v. State