915 So. 2d 365 - State v. Willis’s Empirical Analysis
2005
Citation profile
26
cited by 26 later decisions
2
states following
March 2019
most recently cited
26 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Chapman v. State of California · Sullivan v. Louisiana · Mahan & Rowsey, Inc. v. Oklahoma Natural Gas · Collins v. Youngblood · Michelson v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“A. When an accused is charged with a crime involving sexually assaultive behavior, or with acts that constitute a sex offense involving a victim who was under the age of seventeen at the time of the offense, evidence of the accused's commission of another sexual offense may be admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant subject to the balancing test provided in Article 403.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“Article 412.2 did not alter the amount of proof required in the Defendant's case as it merely pertains to the type of evidence which may be introduced. Prior to the enactment of Article 412.2, the testimony at issue was admissible if it fell within an exception under La.Code Evid. Art. 404(B). Article 412.2 merely removed that restriction.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Greene · Kowalski v. State“[t]he erroneous admission of other crimes evidence is subject to harmless error analysis under the standard set out in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). See State v. Gibson, 391 So.2d 421 (La.1980). Under Chapman , an appellate court must decide "whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction," and "the court must be able to declare a belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 . The Chapman standard was later refined in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), as follows: "Consistent with the jury-trial guarantee, the question [ Chapman ] instructs the reviewing court to consider is not what effect the constitutional error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable jury, but rather what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand.... The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error." (emphasis in original).”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.