916 So. 2d 1268 - State v. Roshell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Before a confession may be introduced into evidence, “it must be affirmatively shown that it was free and voluntary, and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises.” La. R.S. 15:451. The state bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the free and voluntary nature of the confession at a hearing on a motion to suppress. State v. Coleman, supra; State v. Hills, 354 So.2d 186 (La.1977). The state must also affirmatively prove that the defendant was first advised of his Miranda rights and that the confession was not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or promises. State v. Johnson, 36,01 (La.App.2d Cir.6/12/02), 821 So.2d 652 . The testimony of the interviewing police officer alone may be sufficient to prove the defendant’s statement was given freely and voluntarily. State v. Trotter, 37,325 (La.App.2d Cir.8/22/03), 852 So.2d 1247 , writ denied, 2003-2764 (La.2/13/04), 867 So.2d 689 , recon. denied, 2003-2764 (La.4/23/04), 870 So.2d 282 ; State v. Henderson, 31,986 (La.App.2d Cir.8/18/99), 740 So.2d 240 . In State v. Jackson, 381 So.2d 485 (La.1980), and State v. Morvant, 384 So.2d 765 (La.1980), the Louisiana Supreme Court stated the principles under which the admissibility of a confession must be judged. As a matter of federal constitutional law, a confession obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, or by the exertion of any improper influ”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Boyer · 129 So. 3d 38 - State v. Harrington

2. “Any person who, after having been convicted in this state of a felony * * *, thereafter commits any subsequent felony within this state, upon conviction of said felony, shall be punished as follows * * *”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Jones · 979 So. 2d 678 - State v. Jackson

3. “In reviewing the record for error patent, we find that the defendant was improperly adjudicated a third felony offender. The habitual offender provisions found in La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1) provide, |2Sin pertinent part, “Any person who, after having been convicted within this state of a felony ..., thereafter commits any subsequent felony within this state, upon conviction of said felony, shall be punished as follows .... ” (Emphasis added.) This statute and jurisprudence require that prior convictions must precede the commission of the principal offense in order for use to enhance a defendant’s status as a multiple offender.... [[Image here]] The listing of convictions shows that at the time of the commission of the third felony, the defendant had not yet been convicted of the forgery used as the second felony offense for purposes of adjudication as a third felony offender. In light of this error in the habitual offender adjudication, we hereby reverse the defendant’s adjudication as a third felony offender and the 100 year sentence for the count three armed robbery as a third felony offense. We remand the matter to allow the state to bring a new habitual offender proceeding and for the trial court to then re-sentence the defendant on the enhanced armed robbery conviction.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 149 So. 3d 310 - State v. Webb