Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

22 federal appellate · 16 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 65 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In order to establish state taxpayer standing, plaintiffs must show that the challenged activity involves “a measurable appropriation” or loss of revenue, and “a direct dollars-and-cents injury” to themselves, Doremus [, 342 U.S. at 434 , 72 S.Ct. 394 ], Plaintiffs have failed to make such a showing. The stamps are sold at government offices that exist for another purpose, and plaintiffs do not allege that additional employees are hired to handle the stamp business.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Doe v. Madison School District No. 321 · Johnson v. Economic Development Corp.

2. “First, as noted above, we think there remains a good possibility that the Cole-gio can operate constitutionally. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has listed a number of useful and important functions performed by the Colegio that are directly linked to the regulation of the legal profession and improving legal services, and it appears that an accounting system now exists for determining the direct and indirect cost of any Colegio activity, see 682 F.Supp. at 688 n. 14. Thus, we think it appropriate to act on the assumption, shared by the district court, that the Colegio will be able to modify its rule to comply with Hudson. Second, the defendants’ interest in maintaining an integrated bar is sufficiently weighty that we should hesitate before halting the system completely. It seems more appropriate to allow the Colegio to continue functioning, at least temporarily, with the compelled dues of members who do not object to its activities. Third, we think that the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision on the integrated bar is likely to spur action that defendants previously may have resisted while pursuing their appeal. Before Keller , it had been nearly three decades since the Court addressed the integrated bar, in Lathrop , and the commentary since that time has questioned the nature and continuing validity of a mandatory bar. See, e.g., “Unified Bar Concept,” 1983 Am.B.Found.J., at 67; C. Sorenson, Jr., “The Integrated Bar and the Freedom of Nonassociation — Continuing”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 59 F. Supp. 2d 260 - Romero v. COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE PUERTO RICO

3. “Despite the Supreme Court’s reluctance in Hudson to confront the ‘constitutional nongermaneness question,’ we think the quoted discussion from Ellis provides the appropriate analysis for resolving the issue. Moreover, not only is the First Amendment not a factor, but ‘[t]he very nature of the free-rider problem and the governmental interest in overcoming it require that the union have a certain flexibility in its use of compelled funds.’ Ellis, 466 U.S. at 456 , 104 S.Ct. at 1896 . We therefore conclude, as did the district court, that activities incidental to the operation of an association — such as social events and the provision of insurance to members— may be financed with mandatory fees.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 59 F. Supp. 2d 260 - Romero v. COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE PUERTO RICO