917 So. 2d 159 - Scott v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"`"`As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' Kolender *Page 1176 v. Lawson , 461 U.S. 352 [357], 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (citations omitted). A statute challenged for vagueness must therefore be scrutinized to determine whether it provides both fair notice to the public that certain conduct is proscribed and minimal guidelines to aid officials in the enforcement of that proscription. See Kolender , supra; Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)."` " Timmons v. City of Montgomery , 641 So.2d 1263 , 1264 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993), quoting McCorkle v. State , 446 So.2d 684 , 685 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983). . . . ". . . . The judicial power to declare a statute void for vagueness `should be exercised only when a statute is so incomplete, so irreconcilably conflicting, or so vague or indefinite, that it cannot be executed, and the court is unable, by the application of known and accepted rules of construction, to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intended.' Jansen v. State ex rel. Downing , 273 Ala. 166 , 170 , 137 So.2d 47 , 50 (1962)."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 25 So. 3d 1169 - Lansdell v. State · 935 So. 2d 1207 - Sellers v. State

2. “"Rule 14.4(b), Ala.R.Crim.P., provides that `[n]otwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court shall not enter a judgment upon such plea without being satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.' `The purpose of requiring the trial judge to determine that there is a factual basis for the plea "is to ensure the accuracy of the plea through some evidence that a defendant actually committed the offense."' Alderman v. State, 615 So.2d 640 , 647 (Ala.Crim.App. *Page 1215 1992), quoting United States v. Keiswetter, 860 F.2d 992 , 995 (10th Cir. 1988), remand order withdrawn and plea vacated on rehearing, 866 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1989) (en banc). `"The only factual basis required for a guilty plea is that which will satisfy the court that the appellant knows what he is pleading guilty to."' Alderman, 615 So.2d at 647 , quoting Garner v. State, 455 So.2d 939 , 940 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984)."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 935 So. 2d 1207 - Sellers v. State

3. “"`It is well accepted that a court, in interpreting a statute, will give words used therein their "`natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning.'"' [ State v.] Randall, 669 So.2d [223 ] at 226 [(Ala.Crim.App. 1995)], quoting Ex parte Etowah County Bd. of Educ., 584 So.2d 528 , 530 (Ala. 1991). "`"Although penal statutes are to be strictly construed, courts are not required to abandon common sense. Absent any indication to the contrary, the words must be given their ordinary and normal meaning."' "Musgrove [v. State], 519 So.2d [565 ] at 582 [(Ala.Crim.App.), aff'd, 519 So.2d 586 (Ala. 1986)], quoting Walker v. State, 428 So.2d 139 , 141 (Ala.Crim.App. 1982)."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 935 So. 2d 1207 - Sellers v. State