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← 918 F. Supp. 1115 - Sharp v. Kelsey

918 F. Supp. 1115 - Sharp v. Kelsey’s Empirical Analysis

1996

Citation profile

10
cited by 10 later decisions
1
states following
July 2018
most recently cited

5 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently July 2018

5 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

30199620002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1746

Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation · Terry v. Ohio · Harlow v. Fitzgerald · Anderson v. Creighton

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Ms. Sharp was convicted of a crime when Judge Hocking summarily found her guilty of criminal contempt for her contumacious conduct in the courtroom. Criminal contempt is a crime like any other in the sense that it is a violation of the law punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. The Supreme Court holds that a summary adjudication of criminal contempt for conduct occurring before a judge affords the contemner due process. Ms. Sharp passed through the due process clause and on to a conviction and sentence in those few minutes in front of Judge Hocking. When Judge Hocking summarily convicted Ms. Sharp of criminal contempt in front of Officer Baird and ordered him to take her to jail, this Court holds that Ms. Sharp was thereafter subject to the protections of the Eighth Amendment and not the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments. At the moment Judge Hocking completed his order with an officer immediately present, any Fourth Amendment seizure was complete because she was not free to go where she pleased. As far as the defendant officers are concerned, Ms. Sharp was never not in custody. This Court is not faced with the problem of a convicted person who has escaped custody. Ms. Sharp was not a suspect, detainee, or fugitive; she was a convicted person in the custody of Officer Baird and the Eaton County Sheriffs Department. Because she was a prisoner in the custody of Officer Baird and the Eaton County Sheriffs Department, any treatment she received on the way to a jail cell is gove”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “came toward him clutching a set of keys in her fist with individual keys protruded from between her fingers like prongs, in a manner he had seen in self-defense classes”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “manner in which they took [plaintiff] to jail”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.