¶1concurring specially:
¶2I concur in the Court’s refusal to accept jurisdiction.
¶3We do not have an actual case or controversy with justiciable issues before us. The parties are merely seeking an advisory opinion on an abstract question, and it has long been the rule that this Court does not give advisory opinions or answer hypothetical questions. See Shinn v. Oklahoma City, 184 Okla. 236, 87 P.2d 136 (1939); City of Shawnee v. Taylor, 191 Okla. 687, 132 P.2d 950 (1943), and cases cited therein.
¶4In addition, this action for declaratory judgment is not properly brought in this Court. Our Declaratory Judgment Act, 12 O.S.1991, § 1651, et seq., places the authority and power to entertain proceedings for declaratory judgments in cases of actual controversy in the district courts.
¶5Finally, it should be remembered that the doctrine of publici juris is not a ground of jurisdiction in itself. It is merely one factor a court may consider in deciding whether to assume original jurisdiction when such jurisdiction already exists on proper grounds.
¶6I have consistently set forth these and additional reasons expressing my conviction that this Court errs when it treats disagreements and disputes between public officers in different branches of government, without more, as lawsuits. See dissenting opinions in Campbell v. White, 856 P.2d 255, 278 (Okla.1993); Ethics Comm’n v. Cullison, 850 P.2d 1069, 1086 (Okla.1993); State ex rel. York v. Turpen, 681 P.2d 763, 768 (Okla.1984); and, Oklahoma Ass’n of Municipal Attorneys v. State, 577 P.2d 1310, 1315 (Okla.1978).
¶7*62KAUGER, Vice CMef Justice, dissenting, with whom WATT, Justice, joins, and with whom SUMMERS, Justice, joins in part II:
¶8I.
¶9ASSUMPTION OF ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
¶10Even if initially no actual justiciable controversy existed under the facts presented at oral argument on April 10th, 1996 — one does now. Since oral argument, the Governor, on April 29, 1996, vetoed House Bill 2982 and, on May 7,1996, vetoed Senate Bill 876.
“TO THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ... This is to advise you that on this date, pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 11 of Article VI of the Oklahoma Constitution to approve or object to legislation presented to me, I have VETOED House Bill 2982. This Bill fails to address the problem of the violation of Section I of Article IV, of the Oklahoma Constitution. The current law provides for a majority of legislative appointments to an executive board which performs administrative duties. This bill does not correct that constitutional infirmity.”
¶11The Governor’s veto message on Senate Bill 876 was identical to that of House Bill 2982.
¶12We are now squarely presented with a real and lively controversy which clearly meets the justiciability requirements.
“The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to a general superintending control over all inferior courts and all Agencies, Commissions and Boards created by law ...”
¶13We must exercise our constitutional duty and assume original jurisdiction and address the merits of this cause. The adoption of the majority opinion would force the parties to manufacture another case in controversy to submit to the district court.
¶14This Court sparingly exercises its superintending power to assume original jurisdiction *63to address issues which are publici juris. In the last 50 years we have assumed original jurisdiction on the basis of publici juris only 44 times — less than once a year.
¶15*64In Ethics Comm’n v. Cullison, 850 P.2d 1069, 1072 (OHa.1993), we invoked original jurisdiction pursuant to the OHa. Const, art. 7, § 4 to address a dispute between two entities of State government — the Legislature and the Ethics Commission. Here, our choice is between assuming jurisdiction or allowing the parties to fashion litigation which would be initiated in district court but which would ultimately be resolved in this Court. An additional irony is imbedded in this second alternative because, insofar as these appointments are concerned, there are no disputed fact issues to be resolved. We are faced with a pure question of law. It is the responsibility and duty of the Supreme Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.
¶16In the interest of judicial economy, in its role of superintending control of all boards and agencies, and in the interest of the public, this Court has consistently addressed issues of great public concern. For example, in Southwestern Bell Tel. v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 873 P.2d 1001, 1009-10 (Okla.1994), cert. denied — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 191, 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994), we addressed the question of whether there is a right to an unbiased decisionmaker in ratemaking proceedings when the proceedings are legislative in nature. However, “[i]n an attempt to conserve judicial resources, as well as the resources of the rate payers,” the Court, after deciding the case in controversy, rendered authoritative advice on the right to an unbiased decision maker in adjudicative proceedings as well. In Williams Natural Gas Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 891 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Okla.1994), we were presented with questions concerning whether the State Board of Equalization could assess differing tax ratios among various public service corporations from that assessed for railroads and airlines. We recognized that, in addition to the public importance of the issues, judicial economy would be served by resolving the publici juris issues and by assuming original jurisdiction to address the merits of the cause.
¶17This Court exercises its superintending power infrequently to assume original jurisdiction to dispose of a cause
¶19THE METAMORPHOSIS FROM OKLAHOMA’S TERRITORIAL LAW TO STATE GOVERNMENT LIMITED THE GOVERNOR’S APPOINTMENT POWER.
¶20It has been recognized since statehood that the Governor has a limited power of appointment. In interpreting the people’s will as expressly written in the Constitution, consideration must be given to what was sought to be avoided by the people of this state.
¶21Oklahoma’s territorial law gave the governor the power to make all appointments. Section 2 of Oklahoma’s Organic Act, 26 Stat. 82 (1890) provides:
“That the executive power of the Territory of Oklahoma Shall be vested in a governor, who shall hold office for four years and until his successor shall be appointed and qualified, unless sooner removed by the president of the United States. The governor shall reside within said Territory; shall be commander-in-chief of the militia thereof; he may grant pardons for offenses against the laws of said Territory; and reprieves for offenses against the laws of the United States, until the decision of the president can be made known thereon; he shall commission all officers who shall be appointed to office under the laws of said Territory, and shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” (Emphasis supplied.)
¶22Nevertheless, when the people of Oklahoma formed a state government and adopted the Oklahoma Constitution, the appointment power created in the Governor was substantially reduced from that accorded by the territorial laws. Under the Constitution, the Governor’s appointment power was restricted by the people of the State of Oklahoma.
“The Governor shall commission all officers not otherwise commissioned by law. All commissions shall run in the name and by the authority of the ‘State of Oklahoma,’ be signed by the Governor, sealed with the Great Seal of the State of Oklahoma, and attested by the Secretary of State. When any office shall become vacant, he shall, unless otherwise provided by law, appoint a person to fill such vacancy, who shall continue in office until a successor shall have been duly elected or appointed, and qualified according to law.” (Emphasis supplied.)
¶23A commission grants the right to have and to discharge the duties of a certain office.
¶24The pursuit of greater appointment powers by Oklahoma governors is neither new nor novel — nor is the answer. We first answered the question posed here in 1914 in Riley, and we last answered it six years ago on June 19, 1990, in In re Initiative Petition No. 344, 797 P.2d 326, 327-330 (Okla.1990), when we rejected an initiative petition ballot title among other reasons because it failed sufficiently to advise the electorate of the total replacement of article 6 of the Oklahoma Constitution.
¶25Some of the changes made by proposed petition No. 344: 1) allowed the governor to appoint a majority of all boards immediately upon taking office and to appoint the remaining members two years later; 2) removed the power of the Legislature to enact laws determining how vacancies of elected offices of the Executive Branch are filled; and 3) removed the Governor’s duty to give each house a full report of each state office and commission. We said that:
“The main thrust of Initiative Petition No. 344 is to repeal the existing article VI of the Oklahoma Constitution and replace it with a new article VI. Article VI is the article which defines the executive branch of government.... It appears from the design of Initiative Petition No. 344 that the effect would be to increase the power of the newly elected Governor from what the designers of the constitution intended. The signatories on the Petition and the voters should be informed of this effect. There is nothing in the statement on the Petition or in the ballot title to so alert the reader. Failure to inform the signatories and voters is deceptive and misleading, and therefore the Petition is invalid.” (Emphasis supplied.)
¶26Shortly thereafter, the Attorney General issued Opinion 90-31 on September 4, 1990, which confined its discussion of gubernatorial appointment power and the legislative appointment of executive officers to art. 4, § 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution. However, the opinion ignored both the clear language of the Oklahoma Constitution and of our opinion in In re Initiative Petition No. 344 which recognized that the Okla. Const. art. 6, § 13 was designed and intended by the people of Oklahoma to limit the appointment power of the Governor. Instead, the Attorney General’s opinion relied on federal policy as well as that from other states regarding the separation of powers.
¶27Apparently, the petitioners rely on Opinion 90-31. While the policies articulated in the opinion are well reasoned, they have no application to Oklahoma constitutional law. Article 4, § 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution addresses the general structure of government. Article 6, § 13 of the Oklahoma Constitution specifically addresses the power of the Governor to make appointments to state boards and commissions. It is well settled that specific provisions of the constitution govern over general provisions — art. 6, § 13 controls here. Even so, under State ex rel. York v. Turpen, 681 P.2d 763, 767 (Okla.1984), the issuance of an opinion finding an act of the Legislature unconstitutional is an unwarranted encroachment upon the power of the Legislature and the unique duty of the courts. An opinion of the Attorney General declaring an act of the Legislature unconstitutional is advisory only and it is not binding upon state officials until determined to be so by a court of competent jurisdiction.
¶28*67The philosophy of the framers of the Constitution has been consistently re-echoed by the people of this state. In 1988, the electorate in State Question 613 voted to make the Labor Commissioner an elected state official rather than permit the Commissioner to be appointed by the Governor. The people have also had two recent opportunities to allow appointment to boards and commissions by persons other than the Governor. In 1990, pursuant to State Question 627, the people created the Ethics Commission with appointees by the Governor, Chief Justice, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Speaker of the House and Attorney General.
¶29CONCLUSION
¶30This Court should exercise original jurisdiction and address the merits of this cause because the cause presents a real and lively controversy which clearly meets the justicia-bility requirements.
¶31The Governor’s appointment power is expressly limited by Okla. Const. art. 6, § 13 which stands in stark contrast to the Governor’s power under Oklahoma’s territorial laws.
¶32. This Court may take judicial notice of House Bill 2982 and Senate Bill 876 and the Governor's vetoes which are attached to the bills. Title 12 O.S.1991 § 2201 provides in pertinent part:
"... B. Judicial notice may be taken by the court of:
1. Private acts and resolutions of the Congress of the United States and of the Legislature of this state, and duly enacted ordinances and duly published regulations of governmental subdivisions or agencies of this state or the United States ..."
¶33Teague v. Scurlock, 223 Ark. 271, 265 S.W.2d 528, 530 (1954) (Recognizing that the courts will take judicial notice of a bill and a governor’s veto which is part of the record of the Legislature.). It is interesting to note that the concurring opinion objects to the Court’s notice of the Governor's veto in House Bill 2982. Evidently, that has not been a problem before. In the mortgage debt case, Willis v. Nowata Land & Cattle Co., 789 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Okla.1989), this Court took judicial notice of a policy which was not in the appellate record. The opinion speculated:
"The standard mortgage clause, on the other hand, operated to create an independent contract between the insurer and the mortgage lender so as to protect the latter from the borrower's misconduct and to shield the lender's own interest in the property. This clause is similar in effect to the general indemnity principles; both treat insurance proceeds as replacement for the destroyed property, rather than as payment toward mortgage debt’s satisfaction. Because the policy itself was not included in this appellate record, we must assume the insurance contract provisions in force when fire occurred contained the standard mortgage clause.” (Emphasis in original.) (Citations omitted.)
¶34In Willis, this Court not only took judicial notice of a standard mortgage clause not in the record, it went much further and surmised that the clause was a standard one. Here, the Court refuses to notice the veto of a legislative enactment — a matter of public law — which clearly applies to the facts presented. When the matter involves the welfare of the public at large, this Court has not hesitated to sua sponte address a public law issue which is dispositive of a cause. See e.g., First Federal Sav. & Loan v. Nath, 839 P.2d 1336, 1339 (Okla.1992); Burdick v. Indep. School Dist. No. 52, 702 P.2d 48, 54 (Okla.1985).
¶35. See, State ex rel. York v. Turpen, 681 P.2d 763, 768 (Okla.1984) (Opala, J., concurring). See also, Application of State ex rel. Dept. of Transp., 646 P.2d 605, 609 (Okla.1982).
¶36.See, Nesbitt v. Apple, 891 P.2d 1235, 1238-39 (Okla.1995); Sharp v. Tulsa County Election Bd., 890 P.2d 836, 839 (Okla.1994); Williams Natural Gas Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 891 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Okla.1994); Campbell v. White, 856 P.2d 255, 257 (Okla.1993); Ethics Comm'n v. Cullison, 850 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Okla.1993); Mov-ants to Quash Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued in Multicounty Grand Jury Case No. CJ-92-4110 Before Dist. Court of Oklahoma County v. Powers, 839 P.2d 655 (Okla.1992); Naylor v. Petuskey, 834 P.2d 439, 440 (Okla.1992); Johnson v. Walters, 819 P.2d 694, 696 (Okla.1991); Golden v. Okfuskee County Election Bd., 723 P.2d 982 (Okla.1986); Davis v. Thompson, 721 P.2d 789, 790 (Okla.1986); DeLafleur v. Indep. School Dist. No. 11 of Tulsa County, 727 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Okla.1986); Stone v. Johnson, 690 P.2d 459, 461 (Okla.1984); State ex rel. York v. Turpen, 681 P.2d 763, 764 (Okla.1984); State ex rel. Cartwright v. Ogden, 657 P.2d 142, 143 (Okla.1982); State ex rel. Poulos v. State Bd. of Equalization, 646 P.2d 1269, 1270 (Okla.1982); Application of State ex rel. Dept. of Transp., 646 P.2d 605, 609 (Okla.1982); State ex rel. Stuart v. Rapp, 632 P.2d 388, 389 (Okla.1981); Smith ex rel. State v. State Bd. of Equalization, 630 P.2d 1264, 1265 (Okla.1981); Draper v. State, 621 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Okla.1980); State ex rel. Howard v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm’n, 614 P.2d 45, 51 (Okla.1980); State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Daxon, 607 P.2d 683, 685 (Okla.1980); State ex rel. Cartwright v. Dunbar, 618 P.2d 900, 903 (Okla.1980); Russell v. Henderson, 603 P.2d 1132, 1134 (Okla.1979); State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Mourer, 596 P.2d 882, 884 (Okla.1979); State ex rel. Wiseman v. Oklahoma Bd. of Corrections, 614 P.2d 551, 552 (Okla.1978); Oklahoma Ass’n of Municipal Attorneys v. State, 577 P.2d 1310, 1312 (Okla.1978); Phillips v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 577 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Okla.1978); State ex rel. Grand Jury of McCurtain County v. Pate, 572 P.2d 226, 227 (Okla.1977); Sanders v. Followell, 567 P.2d 84, 86 (Okla.1977); Halstead v. McHendry, 566 P.2d 134, 136 (Okla.1977); In re Application of Bd. of Ed. of Western Heights Indep. School Dist. No. 41, 565 P.2d 677, 679 (Okla.1977); Matter of Suntide Inn Motel, Oklahoma City, 563 P.2d 125, 127 (Okla.1977), overruled on other grounds by Indep. School Dist. No. 89 of Oklahoma County v. City of Oklahoma City, 722 P.2d 1212, 1216 (Okla.1986); Application of Grand River Dam Authority, 554 P.2d 5, 7 (Okla.1976); Wiseman v. Boren, 545 P.2d 753, 755 (Okla.1976); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Bd. of Tax-Roll Corrections of Tulsa County, 510 P.2d 680, 682 (Okla.1973); Barton v. Derryberry, 500 P.2d 281 (Okla.1972); Oklahoma Farm Bureau v. State Bd. of Ed., 444 P.2d 182, 183 (Okla.1968); Hoover Equipment Co. v. Board of Tax Roll Corrections of Adair County, 436 P.2d 645, 646 (Okla.1967); State ex rel. Nesbitt v. Ford, 434 P.2d 934 (Okla.1967); Sublett v. City of Tulsa, 405 P.2d 185, 189 (Okla.1965); Allen v. Burkhart, 377 P.2d 821, 823 (Okla.1962); Welch v. Key, 365 P.2d 154, 156 (Okla.1961); State ex rel. Bd. of Education of City of Sapulpa v. State Bd. of Education, 197 Okla. 324, 170 P.2d 540, 541 (Okla.1946); Wells v. Childers, 196 Okla. 353, 165 P.2d 371, 374 (Okla.1945).
¶37. See, Sharp v. Tulsa County Election Bd., see note 3, supra; See also, State ex rel. Cartwright v. Ogden, note 3, supra; and State ex rel. Poulos v. State Bd. of Equalization, note 3, supra, which recognize that where the matter is publici juris we assume original jurisdiction and proceed to consider the case on the merits.
¶38. State ex rel. Peterson v. Olson, 307 N.W.2d 528, 530 (N.D.1981); State ex rel. Link v. Olson, 286 N.W.2d 262, 266 (N.D.1979).
¶39. The petitioner is the Chief Executive Officer of the State of Oklahoma who appears in his representative capacity to seek relief from this Court. The Governor’s position is that this legislation impedes his freedom of appointment power. Clearly, the petitioner has standing to prosecute this action. See, State ex rel. York v. Turpen, note 2, supra, (Opala, J. concurring).
¶40. Ethics Comm'n v. Cullison, see note 3, supra;Nesbitt v. Apple, see note 3, supra (Issues arising out of dispute as to the lawful holder of office of state corporation commissioner were publici jur-is.).
¶41. Okla. Const, art. 5, § 60 provides:
"The Legislature shall provide by law for the establishment and maintenance of an efficient *64system of checks and balances between the officers of the Executive Department, and all commissioners and superintendents, and boards of control of State institutions, and all other officers entrusted with the collection, receipt, custody, or disbursement of the revenue or moneys of the State whatsoever."
¶42Okla. Const. art. 6, § 13 provides:
"The governor shall commission all officers not otherwise commissioned by law. All commissions shall run in the name and by the authority of the ‘State of Oklahoma,' to be signed by the Governor, sealed with the Great Seal of the State of Oklahoma, and attested by the Secretary of State. When any office shall become vacant, he shall unless otherwise provided by law, appoint a person to fill such vacancy, who shall continue in office until a successor shall have been duly elected or appointed, and qualified according to law.”
¶43. For example, in 1995, this Court assumed original jurisdiction in nearly one forth of the 270 original jurisdiction actions that were presented to the Court.
¶44. Capitol Steel & Iron Co. v. Fuller, 206 Okla. 638, 245 P.2d 1134, 1138 (Okla.1952).
¶45. Okla. Const. art 5, § 60, see note 8, supra.
¶46. The mindset of the members of the Constitutional Convention is also revealed by the treatment of the Office of the Lieutenant Governor. Because of the apparent abuse of the power to appoint standing committees of the state senates by some Lieutenant Governors in other states, (especially in Missouri a few years before), the members of the Constitutional Convention also deprived the Lieutenant Governor of the privilege of appointing the standing committees of the Oklahoma State Senate. Albert H. Ellis, A History of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Oklahoma, p. 137 (1923). The Okla. Const. art. 5, § 28 provides:
"The Senate shall, at the beginning of each regular session and at such other times as may be necessary, elect one of its members President pro tempore, who shall preside over its deliberations in the absence or place of the Lieutenant Governor; and the Senate shall provide for all its standing committees and, by a majority vote, elect members thereof.”
¶47. United States v. Planter, 27 Fed.Cas. 544, 546 (1852).
¶48. Dew v. Judges of Sweet Springs Dist. Ct., 3 Hen. & M. 1, 43, 3 Am.Dec. 639, 648, 13 Va. 1 (1808).
¶49. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. State Bd. for Property and Cas. Rates, 637 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Okla.1981); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Bd. of Tax-Roll Corrections of Tulsa County, 510 P.2d 680, *67681 (Okla.1973); State ex rel. Nesbitt v. District Court of Mayes County, 440 P.2d 700, 707 (Okla.1967).
¶50. Okla. Const. art. 6, § 10.
¶51. Okla. Const. art. 10, § 43.
¶52. State ex rel. York v. Turpen, see note 2, supra, (Opala, J. concurring).
¶53. See, Okla. Organic Act, 26 Stat. 82 (1890) § 2.
¶54dissenting.
¶55Today this Court declines to address this real and substantial dispute between two contending departments of government over the appointment of members of boards and commissions. The majority holds that there is no urgency involved in this dispute and thus no need for a speedy resolution. The parties are left to pursue the matter in the district court and undoubtedly to again visit this Court on appeal for de novo review of the same legal issues based on the same undisputed facts. The parties are thus left to run the gauntlet of meaningless litigation. I must dissent.
¶56Petitioners note that the issues presented go to “the fundamental structure of government in Oklahoma.” Respondents believe that if Petitioners’ requested relief is granted it will constitute “the greatest transfer of power in Oklahoma since the Constitutional Convention.” The impact of this litigation will assuredly go beyond the boards and commissions named as Respondents to dozens of others whose membership is designated in part by some entity other than the Governor. No reasonable mind could dispute the public importance of the issues presented.
¶57In determining whether a controversy is appropriate for the exercise of original jurisdiction, this Court has considered both the importance and urgency of resolving the dispute. The majority focuses on only one of these guiding principals. Urgency is but one factor militating towards the assumption of original jurisdiction. It is to be weighed alongside the importance of the issues involved. The majority has weighed urgency *68so heavily in the equation that it ignores the tremendous importance of the issues.
¶58It is difficult to imagine a controversy whose resolution is more important to the proper functioning of this state’s government. The need for review is heightened by the fact the Legislature has not followed an Attorney General’s opinion which determined that the challenged statutes are constitutionally infirm under a separation of powers analysis.
¶59Original jurisdiction should be assumed rather than waiting to review the issues in the inevitable appeal. Addressing Petitioners’ application would provide the most expeditious method of resolving the controversy. It would also result in less disruption of state government. This Court has not and should not wait for disputes to escalate into a crisis posture before resolving issues of vital public concern such as the ones presented in this dispute between two departments of government. Today’s dispute left unresolved is indeed likely to escalate into tomorrow’s constitutional crisis.
¶60dissenting, and joining KAUGER, Vice Chief Justice, in part.
¶61The Court declines to assume original jurisdiction in this dispute because it has determined that no pressing need for a prompt resolution is present, and the litigants may thus contest the matter in District Court. I respectfully disagree. I would assume original jurisdiction and decide the matter.
¶62First, the matter is clearly one of publici juris, as it affects the State at large. State ex rel. Freeling v. Lyon, 63 Okla. 285, 165 P. 419, 420 (1917). It is true that this is insufficient, by itself, for this Court to assume original jurisdiction and address the merits of a controversy. The fact that a controversy is publici juris is not an independent grant of jurisdiction to this Court. See Wixson v. Green, 521 P.2d 817, 818 (Okla.1974), (a controversy publici juris did not create an independent grant of jurisdiction to adjudicate a matter upon the merits where that jurisdiction was to be exercised by a different agency).
¶63Publici juris is one reason weighing in favor of assuming jurisdiction where the Court otherwise possesses jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. It is most often invoked as one reason for excusing noncompliance with the rule of first seeking relief in the District Court. For example, in Board of Commissioners of Carter County v. Worten, 128 Okla. 104, 261 P. 553, 554 (1927) this Court gave two reasons why the usual rule requiring the petitioners to seek relief in the District Court did not apply. First, we said, because of the public importance of the questions presented, and second, because no other court possessed superintending control over the lower courts.
¶64Another is that the parties may have confused this Court’s power to provide the appropriate remedy with whether a cause of action exists. Fashioning a remedy for a justiciable controversy is well within the historic nature of the judicial power conferred on this Court by Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 1. Ethics Commission v. Cullison, 850 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Okla.1993). Creating a cause of action casts this Court into a more activist role, and it is this role that the Governor asks us to fill today. See Hill v. Graham, 424 P.2d 35, 38 (Okla.1967) describing the creation of a cause of action as judicial legislation. Cf. Karriman v. Orthopedic Clinic, 488 P.2d 1250, 1251-1252 (Okla.1971), (court declined there to create a cause of action).
¶65Justiciability in Oklahoma courts need not be identical to its federal counterpart. Toxic Waste Impact Group, Inc. v. Leavitt, 890 P.2d 906, 910 n. 7 (Okla.1994). However, the exercise of judicial power by this Court (jus-ticiability) must be consistent with that “judicial power” vested in this Court by Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 1, and in accordance with the historically recognized definition of “judicial power” contemplated by the framers of our Constitution. See Draper v. State, 621 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Okla.1980), where we said that construction of our Constitution is to be in accord with the intent of the framers.
¶66At the time our Constitution was adopted this Court exercised judicial power and provided original jurisdiction relief to “the party aggrieved.” Thompson v. State ex rel. Cooksey, 25 Okla. 741, 108 P. 398, 399 (1910). At *69law the aggrieved plaintiff must have had a direct and immediate legally cognizable interest, while equity allowed additional parties who possessed remote and future interests. 3 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, § 1981 (W.H. Lyon, 14th ed. 1918).
¶67In our case today the Governor expressly disclaims the right to make any particular appointment. He states that some unnamed executive officials must make the appointments. In substance, his allegation is not that he as Governor is the aggrieved party, but that he and/or some unnamed executive officers are aggrieved. In an action seeking declaratory relief against the State the petitioner must be the party aggrieved and the controversy must be justiciable. Ethics Commission v. Cullison, 850 P.2d at 1073.
¶68Challenging a public appointment was at one time redressable via the remedy of mandamus, and a member of the public possessed a cause of action to seek such relief. Thompson v. State ex rel. Cooksey, supra.In contemporary jurisprudence an action in the nature of quo warranto is used to challenge such an appointment. A quo warranto proceeding may be brought by the Attorney General or a District Attorney. 12 O.S.1991 § 1533. We have also recognized that rival appointees possess an interest sufficient to be adjudicated in a quo warranto proceeding. Cox v. Dawson, 911 P.2d 272 (Okla.1996); Nesbitt v. Apple, 891 P.2d 1235 (Okla.1995); Abitbol v. Priore, 797 P.2d 335 (Okla.1990). A member of the public, as such, does not possess an interest cognizable in quo warran-to to challenge an appointment. Jackson v. Freeman, 905 P.2d 217, 219 (Okla.1995).
¶69If the Governor made an executive appointment to fill one of the positions he thinks is unconstitutionally filled by a legislative appointee, then the Governor’s appointee would possess an interest sufficient to put in issue in a quo warranto proceeding the constitutionality of the appointment process. Cox v. Dawson, supra; Nesbitt v. Apple, supra; Abitbol v. Priore, supra.What the Governor asks this Court to do is to create a cause of action to allow him, using the procedural vehicle of declaratory relief, to contest the title of the offices held by legislative appointees prior to his act of creating rival appointees.
¶70It is certainly true that this Court may create a cause of action, and we have done so recognizing the changing conditions of society, the possibility for evolution of the common law, and the reasonable expectations of the aggrieved to redress within the framework of a traditional judicial action. Williams v. Hook, 804 P.2d 1131, 1137-1138 (Okla.1990), (loss of parental consortium); Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, Inc., 725 P.2d 300, 302-304 (Okla.1986), (dram shop action); McCormack v. Oklahoma Publishing Company, 613 P.2d 737, 740 (Okla.1980), (invasion of privacy).
¶71What we have is a controversy between the Governor and the leadership of the Legislature, a dispute of great public concern at the very top of two branches of government. Were I writing for the Court I would recognize that the Governor, as the appointing power for many executive officers, has an interest in determining the scope of that power prior to making an appointment to an office which would result in rival claimants to that office, the other claimants being those advanced by the Legislature. I would thus create a legally cognizable interest possessed by the Governor, to be adjudicated within the context of declaratory relief in such circumstances. Having assumed original jurisdiction on that issue I would resolve the controversy as explained by Kauger, V.C.J., in her opinion, and I join that latter part of her opinion.