Duckett v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “.“The testimony of these witnesses was generally cumulative to that presented at the penalty phase. See Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So.2d 1009, 1021 (Fla.1999) (‘Much of the mitigating evidence that [defendant] faults counsel for not presenting is cumulative to that presented by the mental health expert and [defendant] during the resentencing proceeding.’); Routly v. State, 590 So.2d 397, 401 (Fla.1991) (finding that defendant did not demonstrate reasonable probability that sentence would have been different where much of the proffered mitigating evidence was already before the judge and jury in a different form). Trial counsel’s performance was not deficient simply because he did not present cumulative evidence. See Cole v. State, 841 So.2d 409 (Fla.2003) (rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claim where counsel did not. present cumulative evidence- of defendant’s drug, problem); Valle v. State, 705. So.2d 1331, 1334-35 (Fla.1997) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on trial counsel’s failure to present cumulative.evidence).””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 198 So. 3d 530 - Larry Dunaway v. State of Alabama. · 701 F. Supp. 2d 1245 - Duckett v. McDonough

2. “The United States Supreme Court has stated that “[a] defendant’s mental condition is not necessarily at issue in every criminal proceeding.” Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). As he testified at the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel had no reason to suspect that any mental mitigating evidence could be developed. See Mills v. State, 603 So.2d 482, 485 (Fla.1992) (finding trial counsel’s actions did not constitute deficient performance where trial counsel had no reason to suspect that any mental health mitigating evidence could be developed). This is not a case where the defendant had a severe mental disorder that should have been presented to the jury. See e.g., Rose v. State, 675 So.2d 567, 573 (Fla.1996) (“[Sjevere mental disturbance is a mitigating factor of the most weighty order, and the failure to present it in the penalty phase may constitute prejudicial ineffectiveness.”). Even the expert Duckett presented in support of his postconviction motion did not find any mental problems. Dr. Patricia Fleming, a clinical psychologist, testified that she evaluated and tested Duckett, reviewed information about his life, and interviewed some of his family members. She summarized Duckett’s test results as follows: The test results show that this is an intellectually sound man who is able to organize information, to think rationally and act purposefully and deal effectively with the environment. He has the intellectual strengths and capacities”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 701 F. Supp. 2d 1245 - Duckett v. McDonough

3. “In claim 1(f), Duckett argues that trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to consolidating the charges of sexual battery and first-degree murder because it paved the way for admission of the Williams rule testimony. We conclude that trial counsel was not ineffective for stipulating to consolidation. Charges arising out of the same occurrence such as those brought against Duckett are routinely consolidated. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.150(a) (“Two or more offenses that are triable in the same court may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense, where the offenses ... are based on the same act or transaction or on 2 or more connected acts or transactions.”); Mendyk v. State, 545 So.2d 846, 849 (Fla.1989) (approving consolidation of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and sexual battery charges because the crimes were committed in a continuous episode on a single victim); Clark v. State, 379 So.2d 97, 103 (Fla.1979) (approving consolidation of charges of murder, extortion, and kidnapping); Wright v. State, 739 So.2d 1230, 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (approving consolidation of charges of sexual battery and engaging in sexual activity with a person sixteen or seventeen years old where the “related offenses arose from and were based on the same act or transaction, which occurred in one location within a short period of time”). The sexual battery and murder of the victim in this case were committed by the same person on a single victim in a si”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 701 F. Supp. 2d 1245 - Duckett v. McDonough