Commonwealth v. Kearney’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

18 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[Our Supreme] Court presumes judges of this Commonwealth are honorable, fair and competent, and, when confronted with a recusal demand, have the ability to determine whether they can rule impartially and without prejudice. The party who asserts a trial judge must be disqualified bears the burden of producing evidence establishing bias, prejudice, or unfairness necessitating recusal, and the decision by a judge against whom a plea of prejudice is made will not be disturbed except for an abuse of discretion. As a general rule, a motion for re-cusal is initially directed to and decided by the jurist whose impartiality is being challenged. In considering a re-cusal request, the jurist must first make a conscientious determination of his or her ability to assess the case in an impartial manner, free of personal bias or interest in the outcome. The jurist must then consider whether his or her continued involvement in the case creates an appearance of impropriety and/or would tend to undermine public confidence in the judiciary. This is a personal and unre-viewable decision that only the jurist can make. Where a jurist rules that he or she can hear and dispose of a case fairly and without prejudice, that decision will not be overruled on appeal but for an abuse of discretion. [A] trial judge should recuse himself whenever he has any doubt as to his ability to preside impartially in a criminal case or whenever he believes his impartiality can be reasonably questioned. It is presumed ”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hvizdak, R. v. Linn, D. · Commonwealth v. Sarvey

2. “[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. They may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible. .., Not establishing bias or partiality, however, are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as [ ] judges, sometimes display. A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—remain immune. However, [a] judge’s remarks to counsel during trial do not warrant reversal unless the remarks so prejudice the jurors against the defendant that it may reasonably be said [that the remarks] deprived the defendant of a fair and impartial trial.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2016 Pa. Super. 310 - Commonwealth v. Rayner · J.R. Cellucci and E.H. Cellucci, his wife v. Laurel HOA

3. “an appellant cannot bootstrap a series of meritless claims into a cumulative claim of error. See Commonwealth v. Rolan , 964 A.2d 398 , 411 (Pa.Super. 2008) ("No number of failed claims may collectively attain merit if they could not do so individually .") (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams , 532 Pa. 265 , 615 A.2d 716 , 722 (Pa. 1992) (emphasis in original).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Patterson · Commonwealth v. Scott