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← 92 F.2d 726 - Burgoon v. Lavezzo

Burgoon v. Lavezzo’s Empirical Analysis

92 F.2d 726 · 1937

Citation profile

38
cited by 38 later decisions
6
states following
September 2015
most recently cited

15 federal appellate · 4 district · 16 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 38 later decisions — most recently September 2015 · most notably G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc. v. Levenson (1995), Pipola v. Chicco (1960)

15 federal appellate · 4 district · 16 state decisions

110193719401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Ætna Life Insurance v. Middleport · Factors' & Traders' Insurance v. Murphy · Barnes v. . Mott · Shaffer v. McCloskey · Prestridge v. Lazar

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “those who in respect of contemplated property transactions do not consult available lien records seems more the task of the school than of the court.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “Since the equitable doctrine of subro-gation was ingrafted on the English equity jurisprudence from the civil law, it has been steadily growing in importance, and widening its sphere of application. It is a creation of equity, and is administered in the furtherance of justice. It is applied to give the party who actually pays the debt the full benefit and advantage of such payment. It has been long settled, and it is not controverted, that the doctrine applies where a junior in-cumbrancer discharges the prior incum-brance, and where the surety pays the debt of his principal, and in cases of like character. A just limitation of the application of the doctrine is that it does not apply to payments made by a mere volunteer or stranger.... If [the lender], instead of taking a release of the two mortgages, had taken an assignment of them, the question here discussed would never have been raised. As he paid off the mortgages at the request of the debtors, they would unquestionably have been assigned to him without recourse, had he requested it. He was entitled to an assignment-If it be correct that [the lender’s] position was not that of a volunteer or stranger, then it is immaterial that a release, instead of an assignment, was made. Where the rights of innocent third persons have not intervened, the release will not prevent the person making the payment from becoming the equitable assignee of the claim paid.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “The only advantage they have gained is through the money paid by [the purchaser], without any consideration whatever moving from them. They claim the benefit, solely through the mistake of [the purchaser]. The [junior lienor] does not pretend to have earned a farthing of their claim. They simply say, the cold blood of the law permits them to take ... [the purchaser’s] money. We think that to recognize equitable assignment does not impair any rights of the junior lienor worthy of equitable recognition against the position of one who in ignorance of the junior lien advances a part of purchase price to discharge a senior lien. For the only “rights” of the junior lienor that can be said to be actually impaired are gambling “rights” to profit by a purchaser’s mistake.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.