Watkins v. Miller’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Although the requirement of exhausting available state remedies and the doctrine of procedural default are closely related and are often addressed together, there is an important difference between them. To determine whether a claim has been exhausted, the question is whether any meaningful state remedies are still available at the time of the federal petition. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 ,125-26 n. 28, 102 S.Ct. 1558 , 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982); accord, Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 , 109 S.Ct. 1056 , 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989)(“the requisite exhaustion may nonetheless exist, of course, if it is clear that respondent’s claims are now procedurally barred under Pennsylvania law”); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-298 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). Thus, even though a claim was never presented to the state courts (at least as a constitutional claim), state remedies for the claim can be exhausted for purposes of § 2254(b) if it is clear that the doors of the state courts are no longer open to consider the claim. In such cases, even if a claim was procedurally defaulted in the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied because there are no longer remedies available for the petitioner to exhaust. See Gray v. Nether-land, 518 U.S. 152, 161 , 116 S.Ct. 2074 , 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996)(because exhaustion requirement refers only to remedies still available at the time of the federal petition, it is satisfied if it is clear the petitioner’s claims are now procedu”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 144 F. Supp. 2d 984 - Laugharn v. Scott

2. “(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 348 F. Supp. 2d 825 - Cameron v. Birkett

3. “The writ will not prohibit the State of Indiana from taking steps to retry Watkins. Although the difficulties of doing so now — after the passage of time, after Ackeret has recanted his testimony, and after the DNA evidence has become available — are obvious, that is a decision for state authorities.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State v. Larkins, Unpublished Decision (1-12-2006)