92 Md. App. 325 - State v. Klingenstein’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he culling of tainted information and the determination of whether the remaining untainted information is adequate to show probable cause is also a matter for the hearing judge in the first instance. The further proceedings on remand to the circuit court should be to that end, not strictured by a culling by the appellate court and a holding by it that the remaining untainted information was adequate. If the hearing judge concludes, after factoring out the tainted information, that the information remaining established probable cause for the issuance of the warrant, he should, of course, uphold it and deny the motion to suppress insofar as it is founded on the unconstitutionality of the issuance of the warrant. The appellate court will then be in a position to perform its function of making an independent constitutional appraisal of the propriety of the hearing court’s rulings.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Jones · Holmes v. State

2. “Applying the Franks v. Delaware principle to the search of the appellee’s home yields a simple conclusion. The mention in the warrant application for the home that Schedule II drugs had been recovered in the search of the pharmacy was not an indispensable or pivotal component of probable cause. It was a de minimis triviality. Remaining, untainted information abundantly established probable cause for the search of the appellee’s home. In all likelihood, if we factored out the very fact that the pharmacy had ever been searched, the probable cause for the search of the home would not be fatally eroded. A fortiori, factoring out the passing mention of those items seized that were a scope violation would not fatally erode that probable cause. There was no justification for the invalidation of the warrant to search the home and for the suppression of its fruits.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Jones · Klingenstein v. State

3. “The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine holds that when the Constitution has been violated in obtaining evidence, such tainted evidence shall not only not be used directly but shall not be used at all. It prohibits not only the direct use of the tainted evidence but also its derivative use. The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine would go further and also bar such derivative uses of such evidence as the exploitation of the knowledge gained so as to develop further leads; or, of pertinence here, the use of such tainted evidence to establish probable cause for the issuance of a subsequent warrant. ... They are sometimes referred to, in a commonplace flight of rhetoric, as “three ways of unpoisoning the fruit.” More aptly, they are three ways of determining that the fruit was not poisoned in the first instance. One of these, not here pertinent, is the “attenuation of taint.” Another, also not here pertinent, is “inevitable discovery.” The third of the exemptions, the one that concerns us in this case, is that of “independent source.” That a constitutional violation preceded the discovery of the evidence in question does not establish that the constitutional violation caused the discovery. The time sequence does, indeed, establish a presumption to that effect. The State is given the opportunity, however, to demonstrate that the evidence proceeded from an independent source. [Citations omitted.]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 93 Md. App. 373 - State v. Darden