92 Md. App. 56 - Eiland v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

63 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 63 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In Sye v. State, 55 Md.App. 356 , 468 A.2d 641 (1983), one of the appellants made the very argument made by the appellants here — that severance was necessary “because his version of the altercation that led to the killing differed from the versions given by his codefendants.” The mere fact that a joint trial may place a defendant in an uncomfortable or difficult tactical situation does not compel a severance. Only the threat of damaging inadmissible evidence does that: “The pertinent question is not whether the State might have had, in some other procedural configuration, a more difficult time in obtaining the testimony of Brooks and Sye. The pertinent question rather is whether the testimony of Brooks and Sye was competent and admissible. It clearly was. Bates was damaged but the damage was legitimate. He received a fair trial with the State using only admissible evidence. The State did not offer any evidence admissible against the others but inadmissible against Bates.” 55 Md.App. at 363 , 468 A.2d 641 . The same argument was also before us on yet an earlier occasion. We rejected it, speaking through then Chief Judge Murphy, in Lipscomb v. State, 5 Md.App. 500 , 248 A.2d 491 (1968). In a joint trial of two codefendants for rape, one claimed that the sexual intercourse was completely consensual. He was understandably chagrined by his codefendant’s starkly contrasting testimony that the victim had struggled and the codefendant had been enlisted to help hold her down. Lipscom”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 128 Md. App. 79 - Fisher v. State

2. “Jay Bias worked at the Hyattsville Branch of the Sovran Bank. On the afternoon of December 4, 1990, two of his coworkers, Andre Campbell and Tydus Mathis, decided to drive to the nearby Prince George’s Plaza Mall during their lunch hour. Hearing their plans, Bias asked to accompany them. He had recently purchased from Kay Jewelers, located in the mall, a ring, which was being sized for him and which he wanted to show to his coworkers. The three drove to the mall in Mathis’s car. While Mathis went off to browse in another part of the mall, Bias and Campbell went to Kay Jewelers, where they were waited on by Shaunelle Tyler, an employee of the store and the wife of the appellant Jerry Tyler. Bias spoke to Shaunelle Tyler about the ring and showed it to Campbell. At approximately the same time ... Jerry Tyler and Gerald Eiland, arrived at the mall in a green Mercedes Benz, owned by Tyler’s father but driven by Eiland. The two of them headed directly for Kay Jewelers. As Bias and Campbell were leaving the jewelers, Jerry Tyler entered. He apparently believed that his wife had been flirting with Jay Bias. A turbulent argument ensued between Tyler and his wife, culminating in Tyler’s hurling a stapler at her. The manager of Kay Jewelers thought it prudent to end the dispute by escorting Tyler out of the store. Bias and Campbell, now rejoined by Tydus Mathis, were standing just outside when Tyler was escorted to the exit. Visibly agitated, Tyler turned to Bias and said, “You can hav”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Tyler v. State

3. “1) that Judge Ahalt erroneously admitted the prior testimony of Eiland given at Eiland’s earlier trial; 2) that Judge Ahalt erroneously granted an eighteen-day continuance in an effort to compel Eiland to testify; 3) that the evidence was not legally sufficient to sustain the convictions; 4) that Judge Ahalt erroneously instructed the jury that the appellant could be convicted as an aider and abetter; 5) that Judge Ahalt committed plain error in instructing the jury on first-degree murder; 6) that Judge Ahalt committed plain error in not instructing the jury that its verdict must be unanimous; 7) that Judge Ahalt erroneously admitted irrelevant and prejudicial testimony from the witness Michael McCutchen; and 8) that Judge Ahalt erroneously excluded testimony from the appellant’s mother.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Tyler v. State