¶1 (after stating the facts). The statute under which the defendant was indicted, reads: “If any person shall attempt, in a wanton and malicious manner, to destroy the reputation of •an innocent woman, by words written or spoken, which amount to a charge of ineontinency, every person so offending shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and fined or imprisoned in the discretion of the court.” The Code, sec. 1113.
¶2 In State v. McDaniel, 84 N. C., 803, the construction given to the statute is, that the “offence defined consists, not in the slander of a woman by falsely charging her with ineontinency, but in the attempt to destroy the reputation of an innocent woman *766 by such means; and by ‘innocent woman’ is meant a pure woman — one whose character, to use the language of the statute, is ‘wisullied’ — that is, undefiled, not stained with moral turpitude — and what is meant by a pure woman, is a chaste woman, and Webster defines chaste to be ‘pure from all unlawful commerce of sexes.’”
¶3 When, then, His Honor in his charge defined an innocent woman to be “ one who had never had actual intercourse with a man,” he has strictly followed the interpretation heretofore given to the statute by this Court; and what His Honor has stated in his charge as to lasciviousness, and the permission of liberties, though uncalled for by the facts of this case, is not inconsistent ■with the construction which has been given to the statute.
¶4 The construction of the statute, as given by this Court, and followed by His Honor, is, in our opinion, very strict, and would seem to exclude from the protection of the law, every woman who had at some time of her life, made a slip in her virtue; and every man, in the course of his life, must have had instances brought to his knowledge, of unfortunate females who have at some period in their lives, been led from the path of virtue by the wiles of a seducer, who had afterwards reformed, and by a course of exemplary conduct established for themselves a character for chastity above all reproach. Shall it be said that these unfortunates áre not to be allowed a “locus penitentice,” and are to be subject forever to the vile tongue of the maligner and slanderer? How this may be, we are not called upon to decide, nor do we express an opinion; but, however it may be, the charge of His Honor is as favorable to the defendant as he could expect or desire. It has certainly done him no harm, and he has no cause to complain.-
¶5 As to the other exception taken by the defendant, to His Honor’s refusal to stop the solicitor’s comments upon the testimony of the defendant as a witness, we are of opinion it cannot be sustained.
¶6 *767 The prosecutrix and defendant were both examined as witnesses in the cause, and there was a direct, conflict in their testimony.
¶7 The female witness’s character was sustained by a number of witnesses, who testified it was very good. If very good, it must have been good for chastity and truth • but the defendant offered no evidence to sustain his character. This made a strong contrast between the testimony of the witnesses, and we think it was a legitimate ground of comment. When the solicitor, after commenting upon the testimony of the female witness, how it had been sustained, said the defendant was without character, it manifestly meant he had not supported his character by witnesses, and was said in reference to the contrast between the testimony of the two witnesses, as they stood before the jury. It was said arguendo, and under the circumstances was entirely legitimate.
¶8 The defendant, as His Honor said in his charge to the jury, stood in the double capacity of defendant and witness. If he had not put himself upon the witness stand, the comments of the solicitor would have been undoubtedly objectionable, but when he introduced himself as a witness, he occupied the same position with any other witness. He was under the same obligations to tell the truth, entitled to the same privileges, received the same protection, and was equally liable to be impeached or discredited. State v. Efler, 85 N. C., 585.
¶9 There is no error. Let this be certified to the Superior Court of Chowan county that the case may be proceeded with in conformity to this opinion and according to law.
¶10 No error. Affirmed.