92 So. 2d 825 - Killen v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

27 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Determination of degree of offense. If the indictment or information charges an offense which is divided into degrees, without specifying the degree, the jurors may find the defendant guilty of any degree of the offense charged; if the indictment or information charges a particular degree the jurors may find the defendant guilty of the degree charged or of any lesser degree. The court shall in all such cases charge the jury as to the degrees of the offense."”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Rollins v. State · Brown v. State

2. ““The Southworth and Henderson cases clearly, under the holding of Riner v. State [ 128 Fla. 848 , 176 So. 38 ], supra, were cases wherein the jury had the power to return a verdict of guilty of a degree of murder less than the first degree murder charged. Thus the language of the statute requiring in such cases that the court charge the jury as to the degrees of the offense operates to change the rule of those cases which had held it was not error under the circumstances to refuse a charge on the lesser degrees of the offense. “We, therefore, hold that in cases involving homicides committed in the perpetration of, ot in the attempt to perpetrate, any of the felonies named in our statute defining murder in the first degree it is necessary to charge the jury on all degrees of unlawful homicide. This rule is particularly applicable to murder in the first degree, which by statute in this State may be committed either from a premeditated design to effect death, or when committed in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any one of the felonies named in said statute, or by a combination of both means. “ * * * Thus, it follows that when a defendant is brought to trial under an indictment drawn in the form approved in the Sloan [Sloan v. State, 70 Fla. 163 , 69 So. 871 ], Sutton [Sutton v. State, 84 Fla. 98 , 92 So. 808 ], and Pope [Pope v. State, 84 Fla. 428 , 94 So. 865 ] cases, supra, that is, in the usual form charging murder to have been committed from a premedita”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 118 So. 2d 574 - State v. Brown

3. “An indictment in the usual form, charging murder to have been done deliberately and premeditatedly, is sufficient under the statute to charge murder in the first degree, regardless of whether the murder was committed in the perpetration of a felony or otherwise. The perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any of the felonies mentioned in the statute, * * * during which perpetration or attempt a homicide is committed, stands in lieu of and is the legal equivalent of that premeditation and deliberation which otherwise are the necessary attributes of murder in the first degree. In such case it is only necessary to make the charge in the ordinary way for murder in the first degree, and show the facts in evidence, and, if they establish that the homicide was committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any of the felonies mentioned in the statute, this will be sufficient.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 214 So. 3d 578 - Calvin Weatherspoon v. State of Florida