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← 920 F.2d 1570 - United States v. Weaver

United States v. Weaver’s Empirical Analysis

920 F.2d 1570 · 1991

Citation profile

76
cited by 76 later decisions
March 2008
most recently cited

67 federal appellate ·

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 3553 · 18 U.S.C. § 3624 · 18 U.S.C. § 3742 · 28 U.S.C. § 994

Relies on Nicholas v. United States · Alexander v. United States · McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco · United States v. Diaz-Villafane · United States v. Mejia-Orosco

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 76 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “First, we will determine whether the guidelines adequately consider a particular factor so as to preclude a district court from relying upon it as a basis for departure. We exercise de novo review of this question of law. Second, we must determine whether there exists sufficient factual support for the departure. This review implicates the district court’s fact-finding role and we are constrained from reversing its findings except for clear error_ Finally, “once we have assured ourselves that the sentencing court considered circumstances appropriate to the departure equation and that those factors enjoyed adequate record support, the direction and degree of departure must, on appeal, be measured by a standard of reasonableness.” In this vein, we must be mindful of “the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence ... and evaluate these in light of “the reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence as stated by the district court[.]” [Appellate courts are also required] to “give due regard to the opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses ... and [to] give due deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “One of the principal reasons Congress adopted the sentencing guidelines was to achieve uniformity in sentencing. Under the former system, the. parole commission and the parole guidelines—not the announced sentence—in fact determined the period of confinement. [Citations omitted]. The initial confinement period determined by the parole board shortly after a prisoner’s arrival is the functional equivalent of what the district court now does at the sentencing hearing under the Sentencing Guidelines. The principal feature which distinguishes the two systems is that now, with one exception, the period of confinement announced by the court is the sentence the offender will serve. Arguably, the parole board’s ability to modify a confinement period represents the sort of arbitrariness rejected under the Sentencing Guidelines. Since the guidelines do not consider the parole eligibility extension [or rather the revoking of that eligibility] in the sentencing calculation, we hold that it is permissible for a district court to depart from the guidelines to account for the parole commission’s extension of a prisoner’s parole range.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.