920 So. 2d 1083 - Black v. Comer’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““As demonstrated by the arguments the parties made to the trial court, there is a dispute in this case as to the parameters of the consent Comer gave Dr. Black for the operation. [[Image here]] “... [T]he pivotal issue in the trial court and on appeal is the scope of the consent. We agree with Dr. Black that the language of the consent does not say that he had the authority to perform only those additional operations or procedures that were in fact therapeutically necessary or advisable; rather, the consent permitted Dr. Black to perform additional operations and procedures he considered therapeutically necessary or advisable in the exercise of his professional judgment. Comer understood that neither the laparoscopy nor the potential laparotomy was intended to target a particular organ or to accomplish a particular therapeutic result; the procedures were ‘diagnostic’ and exploratory in nature and could involve the removal of tissue, depending upon Dr. Black’s findings during the procedures. Comer’s consent was broad and essentially ‘open-ended,’ qualified and conditioned only by the limitation that any additional operations or procedures Dr. Black might perform must be those ‘considered therapeutically necessary or advisable in the exercise of professional judgment.’ Such an authorization does not represent unlimited ‘carte blanche,’ however; it applies only to those operations and procedures that might be considered therapeutically necessary or advisable in the exercise of p”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 38 So. 3d 16 - Black v. Comer

2. ““Comer made the following argument concerning the issue of consent in his motion for a partial summary judgment: “ ‘[Comer] agreed to the removal of a tumor. It is undisputed that no tumor was found at the time of the surgery or since. The fact that Dr. Black negligently failed to identify an organ before removing it, does not then extend consent to the wrongful removal of an organ, simply because Dr. Black failed to identify the known part of the body, and mistook the kidney for a tumor....’ “In opposition to Comer’s motion for a partial summary judgment, Dr. Black made the following argument concerning the scope of the consent given by Comer: “ ‘Dr. Black had [Comer’s] consent to perform the open laparotomy, to perform “such additional operations/procedures during the course of the above as are considered therapeutically necessary or advisable in the exercise of professional judgment” [and][“]to provide such additional services as deemed reasonable and necessary according to medical judgment” and to remove tissue that Dr. Black believed to be abnormal or cancerous. At the very least, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Dr. Black, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Dr. Black had [Comer’s] consent to remove the ectopic kidney which he believed to be abnormal tissue that was possibly cancerous.’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 38 So. 3d 16 - Black v. Comer

3. ““[T]the consent permitted Dr. Black to perform additional operations and procedures he considered therapeutically necessary or advisable in the exercise of his professional judgment.... Comer’s consent was broad and essentially ‘open-ended,’ qualified and conditioned only by the limitation that any additional operations or procedures Dr. Black might perform must be those ‘considered therapeutically necessary or advisable in the exercise of professional judgment.’ Such an authorization does not represent unlimited ‘carte blanche,’ however; it applies only to those operations and procedures that might be considered therapeutically necessary or advisable in the exercise of professional judgment. This language did not authorize Dr. Black to act in whatever fashion he might subjectively think appropriate in the exercise of his professional judgment, regardless of how medically aberrant that judgment might be. Rather, this language authorized only additional operations and procedures considered therapeutically necessary or advisable under the objective standard of care that controls the exercise of professional judgment.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 38 So. 3d 16 - Black v. Comer