United States v. High’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

20 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Analysis of this issue breaks down into two questions: was the defendant seized, and if so at what point; and, if the defendant was seized, was there objective justification sufficient to create reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaging in criminal activity.” 7 . See discussion of the test at pages 1306-1308, infra. 8 . The term "consensual” has unfortunate connotations, because an encounter may be a non-seizure, regardless whether a person has given affirmative consent to speak with an officer. 9 . Note that the test is whether a reasonable person "would have” felt free to leave, not whether a reasonable person “could have” felt free to leave. Thus, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it was more likely than not that a reasonable person would have felt free to leave. The mere possibility that the defendant could escape (remember Hodari D.) or could leave without incident is an insufficient ground to reject a defendant’s contention. 10 . The government submitted an exhibit (Government's Ex. 1), which provided a rough drawing of the Playhouse building and the two lots adjacent to it. No evidence introduced at the hearing supported an inference that the encounter took place anywhere other than in a wide-open area of the lots. Thus, Steele was not "pinned in”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 782 F. Supp. 1301 - United States v. Steele

2. “Although we reject the argument that such encounters are coercive per se, our concern in these drug surveillance cases is this: in deciding whether to approach someone, the police rely on a subtle combination of characteristics and actions, many of which could be attributed to any traveler who detrains or deplanes in an unfamiliar terminal. Often, these observations alone are not sufficiently specific and articulable to establish reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop. Although we think that this can be attributed to a well-trained eye and good police work, it cannot override the fourth amendment just because it gets good results. Consent then becomes crucial in such situations. We suggest that the better procedure might be for the officers to preface their questions with a statement that the encounter is consensual and that the citizen need not answer and is free to go. We do not intend, however, that this suggestion be taken as a requirement that the officers recite any prefatory warning in a Miranda-like fashion. We merely want to emphasize that the police cannot act to intimidate the person or inhibit his or her freedom to leave and not to answer questions.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Berke

3. “a voluntary encounter initiated by non-coercive police questioning, requiring no suspicion at all.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Tom v. Voida