921 So. 2d 904 - State v. Scott’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 33 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause; and (2) the use of all of his peremptory challenges.”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 127 So. 3d 1034 - State v. Segura · 181 So. 3d 223 - State v. Noel

2. “[T]he Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), held that an equal protection violation occurs if a party exercises a peremptory challenge to exclude a prospective juror on the basis of a person's race. See also La.C.Cr.P. art. 795. If Defendant makes a prima facie showing of discriminatory strikes, the burden shifts to the state to offer racially-neutral explanations for the challenged members. The neutral explanation must be one which is clear, reasonable, specific, legitimate and related to the particular case at bar. State v. Collier, 553 So.2d 815, 820 (La.1989). If the race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must decide, in step three of the Batson analysis, whether Defendant has proven purposeful discrimination. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 , 115 S.Ct. 1769 , 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam). A reviewing court owes the district judge's evaluations of discriminatory intent great deference and should not reverse them unless they are clearly erroneous. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364 , 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1868-69 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991); Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, n. 21 , 106 S.Ct. at 1724 . The Batson explanation does not need to be persuasive, and unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral. Purkett, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 . The Hernandez court explained: A neutral explanation in the context of our analysis here means an explanation based on ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 970 So. 2d 113 - State v. ALSANDOR

3. “As a general proposition a person accused in a criminal trial has the right to counsel of his choice. State v. Leggett, 363 So.2d 434 (La.1978); State v. Mackie, 352 So.2d 1297 (La.1977); State v. Anthony, 347 So.2d 483 (La.1977). If a defendant is indigent he has the right to court appointed counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, [ 407 U.S. 25 , 92 S.Ct. 2006 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972)]; State v. Adams, 369 So.2d 1327 (La.1979); City of Baton Rouge v. Dees, 363 So.2d 530 (La.1978). An indigent defendant does not have the right to have a particular attorney appointed to represent him. State v. Rideau, 278 So.2d 100 (La.1973). An indigent’s right to choose his counsel only extends so far as to allow the accused to retain the attorney of his choice, if he can manage to do so, but that right is not absolute and cannot be manipulated so as to obstruct orderly procedure in courts and cannot be used to thwart the administration of justice. State v. Jones, 376 So.2d 125 (La.1979); State v. Leggett, supra; State v. Mackie, supra.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 11 So. 3d 1031 - State v. Reeves