United States v. Singleton’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 district · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Because Miranda procedural violations are only presumptively coercive but not actually coercive, they do not trigger the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine or the ‘cat out of the bag’ analogy. United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir. 1989). Put another way, ‘[w]here the uncounseled statement is voluntary, and thus not a product of “inherently coercive police tactics or methods offensive to due process,” id. [Elstad], 470 U.S. at 317 , 105 S. Ct. at 1297 , there is no fifth amendment violation and the “fruits” may be admissible in the Government’s case in chief.’ United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1517 (6th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit recently discussed the Elstad holding in these terms: ‘Elstad “makes clear that a failure to administer Miranda warnings, without more, does not automatically require suppression of the ‘fruits’ of the uncounseled statement.” United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1517 (6th Cir. 1988). ‘Where the uncounseled statement is voluntary, and thus not a product of ‘inherently coercive police tactics or methods offensive to due process’ . . . there is no fifth amendment violation and the ‘fruits’ may be admissible in the Government’s case in chief.” Id. Similarly, under Elstad , “[i]f the unwarned statement was voluntary, and the allegedly tainted second statement was also voluntary, the second warned statement is admissible” since “[t]he Fifth Amend ment . . . prohibits only the use of c”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Dang

2. “It is uncontroverted that [the motel manager] openly treated [defendant and her friend] as holdover tenants.... Whatever claim of privacy that [defendant] could have based on [the manager] giving [defendant's companion] time to vacate the room need not be resolved, for the allotted time had lapsed before the officers ever entered room 181. Sergeant Koch understood that [the motel manager] had authorized him to enter room 131 in order to eviet the tenants. [The motel manager] plainly intended for the police officers to enter the room for that purpose, as he had sent a maintenance person with a pass key along with the officers.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Loya

3. “[ Wie have held that once the guest's access to the room is no longer his 'exelusive right,' he has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the room even though he himself still has access.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Loya