Pena v. Greffet’s Empirical Analysis
2013
Citation profile
11 district ·
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 15601 (Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003) · 42 U.S.C. § 15609 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 1988
Relies on Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly · Ashcroft v. Iqbal · Conley v. Gibson · Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York · Estelle v. Gamble
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Establishing these limits advances “three basic principles highlighted by the Supreme Court in evaluating substantive due process claims: (1) the need for restraint in defining their scope; (2) the concern that § 1983 not replace state tort law; and (3) the need for deference to local policymaking bodies in making decisions impacting upon public safety.””
8 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“sufficient[ ] 'affirmative conduct on the part of the state in placing the plaintiff in danger.' " Estate of B.I.C. v. Gillen , 702 F.3d at 1187 (quoting Gray v. Univ. Colo. Hosp. Auth. , 672 F.3d 909 , 916 (10th Cir. 2012) ). To state a prima-facie case, the plaintiff must show that his or her danger-creation claim for due-process violations meets a six-part test: (i) the state and individual actors must have created the danger or increased plaintiff's vulnerability to the danger in some way; (ii) the plaintiff must be a member of a limited and specifically definable group; (iii) the defendant's conduct must put the plaintiff at substantial risk of serious, immediate, and proximate harm; (iv) the risk must be obvious and known; (v) and the defendant must have acted recklessly in conscious disregard of that risk. See Pena v. Greffet , 922 F.Supp.2d 1187 , 1227 (D.N.M.2013) (Browning, J.)(citing Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist. , 511 F.3d 1114 , 1126 (10th Cir. 2008) ). In determining whether the danger-creation exception applies, the Tenth Circuit has focused on the deliberateness of the conduct in relation to the caused harm. See Christiansen v. City of Tulsa , 332 F.3d at 1281 . The defendant must recognize the unreasonableness of the risk of the conduct and act "with an intent to place a person unreasonably at risk.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“Whether the conduct shocks the conscience is an objective test, based on the circumstances, rather than a subjective test based on the government actor's knowledge.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.