¶1dissenting.
¶2To understand why the majority is wrong, one need only read the jury charge. Upon doing so it is apparent that, while the charge is erroneous, it is not erroneous in the way that the majority says it is.
¶3The charge erroneously instructed the jury to disregard the officer’s testimony if the jury believed that appellant was not wearing his seat belt. Thus, had the jury believed that appellant was not wearing his seat belt, and followed the instruction, the jury would have disregarded the testimony and acquitted appellant.
¶4The charge did not instruct the jury as to the converse of the above. The charge did not tell the jury what to do if it believed that appellant was wearing his seat belt. In other words, the jury charge authorized acquittal on the wrong basis, but did not authorize conviction on the wrong basis. Thus, the majority is wrong when it says that the erroneous instruction “authorized the stop if appellant was wearing a seat belt.” Op. 172.
¶5As the majority says, there is an appellate presumption that the jury followed the court’s charge absent evidence to the contrary. Op. 172. The majority “find[s] noth-*175mg to indicate the jury did not follow the trial judge’s erroneous instruction.” Op. 173. But we know that the juxy did not follow the erroneous part of the instruction—to do so would have resulted in acquittal. The majority says, “[T]he only way the jury could have convicted was by using illegally obtained evidence.” In fact, the only way the jury could have convicted was by disregarding the erroneous instruction and acting in accord with the rest of the jury charge and the jury arguments.
¶6The Court of Appeals correctly applied the analysis set out in Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (op. on rehearing) and reached a conclusion “within a reasonable zone of disagreement.” Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (op. on rehearing). I would affirm the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the trial court.