Huff v. Telecheck Servs., Inc.’s Empirical Analysis
923 F.3d 458 · 2019
Citation profile
2 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1681G · 15 U.S.C. § 1681I · 15 U.S.C. § 1681S · 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 1692G (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 922 (Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act)
Relies on Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife · Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment · United States v. Lopez · William Marbury v. James Madison · City of Boerne v. Flores
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The [FCRA] does not contain such interlocking statutory protections [as the FDCPA]. While it allows consumers to look into and correct information in their files, it does not provide a shield from imminent economic harm in the way the [FDCPA] does. The [FCRA's] main target is the dissemination of inaccurate and harmful information, just as in Spokeo . See 136 S. Ct. at 1550 . Because TeleCheck's nondisclosure never harmed Huff, and because it did not create a material risk that Huff would suffer a check decline, Huff has not suffered an injury in fact. The difference between Macy and this case comes down to a difference in how Congress exercised its power. In Macy , Congress did not trespass on Article III because the statutory violation was closely connected to real economic harm and thus amounted to an injury in fact. In this instance, Congress crossed the line. It has not shown how a deprivation of information that neither holds consequences for the consumer nor imposes a real risk of harm creates an injury. In the absence of that showing, we have only Congress's say-so, and that does not suffice-at least so long as the federal courts preserve the Constitution's structural boundaries.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“the violation of a procedural right granted by [FACTA] is sufficient in and of itself to constitute concrete injury in fact because Congress conferred the procedural right to protect a plaintiff's concrete interests and the procedural violation presents a material risk of real harm to that concrete interest.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent“Although Congress wields broad authority to define injuries, it does not have a blank check.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.