Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 925 F.2d 374 - Marshall v. Dugger

Marshall v. Dugger’s Empirical Analysis

925 F.2d 374 · 1991

Citation profile

19
cited by 19 later decisions
3
states following
August 2008
most recently cited

10 federal appellate · 1 district · 3 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 636

Relies on Faretta v. California · Bonner v. City of Prichard · Daniel v. Security Pacific National Bank · Figueroa v. United States · Bush v. Florida

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[A] criminal defendant has both a constitutional right to representation by counsel and a constitutional right to self-representation. To accommodate both of these rights simultaneously, this court has held that the right to counsel “is preeminent over the right to self-representation because the former attaches automatically and must be waived affirmatively to be lost, while the latter does ‘not attach unless and until it is asserted.’ ” Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125 , 1143 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc) (quoting Dorman v. Wainwright, 798 F.2d 1358 1366 (11th Cir.1986.)). Waiver of the right to counsel and invocation of the correlative right to self-representation is no simple matter, however. Two requirements must be met. First, the defendant must “dearly and unequivocally” assert his desire to represent himself thus waiving his right to counsel. Second, the court must determine that the defendant has made this election “knowingly and intelligently. ””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “COURT: So, do you want to have [court-appointed counsel] represent you or do you want to represent yourself? DEFENDANT: Well, I’d like to say, Your honor, I don’t feel that [court-appointed counsel] is qualified to represent my case. PROSECUTOR: You still want to proceed on your own behalf without any advice from an attorney ... ? DEFENDANT: I would love to have any attorney but— PROSECUTOR: That is not the— DEFENDANT: But I don’t want [court-appointed counsel]. PROSECUTOR: The question is whether or not you want to proceed without the services of [court-appointed counsel]. DEFENDANT: I don’t feel as though [court-appointed counsel] is qualified to handle my case. PROSECUTOR: Okay. Then I assume your answer is yes, you don’t want [court-appointed counsel] advising you in any respect; is that correct? DEFENDANT: Right.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “Mr. Garey, I have already made the decision and found you competent to represent yourself and your decision to proceed with your own representation was made freely and voluntarily, after hearing from you yesterday.” R13 at 4. 6 . The Marshall court stated that ''[w]hen asked to choose among the three options presented by the court — (1) continue with his appointed counsel, (2) represent himself with the aid of standby counsel, or (3) represent himself alone — Marshall simply rejected representation or standby representation by his appointed counsel.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.