925 So. 2d 232 - Ex Parte State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Green was in direct peril of being convicted and punished for first degree murder at his first trial. He was forced to run the gantlet once on that charge and the jury refused to convict him. When given the choice between finding him guilty of either first or second degree murder it chose the latter. In this situation the great majority of cases in this country have regarded the jury's verdict as an implicit acquittal on the charge of first degree murder. But the result in this case need not rest alone on the assumption, which we believe legitimate, that the jury for one reason or another acquitted Green of murder in the first degree. For here, the jury was dismissed without returning any express verdict on that charge and without Green's consent. Yet it was given a full opportunity to return a verdict and no extraordinary circumstances appeared which prevented it from doing so. Therefore it seems clear, under established principles of former jeopardy, that Green's jeopardy for first degree murder came to an end when the jury was discharged so that he could not be retried for that offense. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 [(1949)]. In brief, we believe this case can be treated no differently, for purposes of former jeopardy, than if the jury had returned a verdict which expressly read: 'We find the defendant not guilty of murder in the first degree but guilty of murder in the second degree.' "After the original trial, but prior to his appeal, it is indisputable that Green could ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 980 So. 2d 966 - Ex Parte Gillentine

2. ““The jury verdict at the conclusion of Bradley’s trial represented more than an implicit acquittal of the charge of robbery in the first degree; under the instructions by which the jury was bound, its verdict included an explicit acquittal with respect to the offense of robbery in the first degree. The jury was instructed that only if it found that the State had failed to prove all of the elements of robbery in the first degree, so that the jury could not find Bradley guilty of that offense, should it ‘[i]n that event, ... move to consideration of the lesser included offense of assault in the second degree.’ ‘The law is well settled that this Court will presume that the jury followed the trial court’s instructions unless there is evidence to the contrary.’ Wootten v. Ivey, 877 So.2d 585, 590 (Ala.2003). The verdict form, which listed in descending order the available verdict options by which Bradley could be found guilty of robbery in the first degree, assault in the second degree, or assault in the third degree or be found simply ‘not guilty,’ conformed to the jury instructions, so that the verdict form contained no option that stated that Bradley was not guilty of robbery in the first degree. The verdict of not guilty of first-degree robbery was an explicit condition precedent, under the trial court’s instructions, to the jury’s proceeding to consider the offenses of assault in the second and third degrees. Accordingly, proceeding under those instructions and using the conf”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ex Parte McCombs

3. “`The law is well settled that this Court will presume that the jury followed the trial court's instructions unless there is evidence to the contrary.'”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 980 So. 2d 966 - Ex Parte Gillentine