Joubert v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “One might reasonably argue that the purposes of probation would be better advanced if [the condition] were interpreted as the State suggests — to allow probation officers to conduct unrestricted, unannounced searches of a probationer’s residence. However, other societal interests support [the probationer’s] interpretation of [the condition]. As the supreme court recognized in Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1977), there is a price to be paid for adopting a rule that probationers and parolees give up all of their Fourth Amendment rights simply because they are on probation or parole: Fourth amendment protection will be diminished not only for parolees, but also for the family and friends with whom the parolee might be living. Those bystanders may find themselves subject to warrantless searches only because they are good enough to shelter the parolee, and they may therefore be less willing to help him — a sadly ironic result in a system designed to encourage reintegration into society. Roman, 570 P.2d at 1243 (quoting Note, Striking the Balance Between Privacy and, Supervision: The Fourth Amendment and Parole and Probation Officer Searches of Parolees and, Probationers, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rev 800, 816 (1976)).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Turek

2. “[W]e note that we do not have complete liberty to construe [the condition] as we think best. In Alaska, a defendant has the choice whether to accept the sentencing court’s offered conditions of probation or to refuse and serve the suspended prison term instead.... Thus, to a certain extent, “the terms of probation might be likened to a contract between the court and the defendant”. In construing [the condition], we must therefore examine how a reasonable person in [the probationer’s] place would have understood it, taking into consideration “the language of the disputed provision ... and the case law interpreting similar provisions”. As noted before, the language of [the condition] does not, on its face, grant a probation officer the kind of open-ended authorization to search that the State argues for. Instead [the condition] is worded so as to impose an obligation upon [the probationer] — the obligation to submit to a search whenever requested by his probation officer. Thus, the language of the disputed provision appears to support [the probationer’s] interpretation — that the probation officer’s authority to search is premised on [the probationer] receiving notice of the intended search.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Turek

3. “contract between the court and the defendant”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Alvin v. State