Eddleman v. Switchcraft, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis
927 F.2d 316 · 1991
Citation profile
13 federal appellate ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 16 later decisions — most recently July 2022
13 federal appellate ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 29 U.S.C. § 626 (§ 7 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967) · 42 U.S.C. § 1988
Relies on Hensley v. Eckerhart · Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. · City of Riverside v. Rivera · Blanchard v. Bergeron · Ustrak v. Fairman
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The record before us makes clear that the district court considered many permissible factors in deciding to adjust downward the recoverable attorney’s fee. It is not clear to us, however, how the district court determined that the contingency fee arrangement was the appropriate recoverable attorney’s fee. The fundamental problem is that, although Hensley [v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 , 103 S.Ct. 1933 , 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)] “directed lower courts to make an initial estimate of reasonable attorney’s fees by applying prevailing billing rates to the hours reasonably expended on successful claims,” it appears that the district court never completed the calculation of its lodestar figure. The district court began its determination of attorney’s fees by evaluating the number of hours Ms. Ed-dleman’s attorney spent representing the plaintiff. The court examined the time spent by Ms. Eddleman’s attorney “based upon the time the court believes it would take a competent lawyer to perform certain of the tasks [performed by Ms. Eddleman’s counsel.]” The district court then specifically identified instances of what it considered an unreasonably high number of hours expended by plaintiff’s attorney; in its calculation the district court considered the skills of Ms. Eddleman’s attorney and the requisite skill to present the case.... However there is no indication that the court established the other key factor in the lodestar calculation, a reasonable hourly rate for Ms. Eddleman’s attorney. ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“While it is clear the district court considered relevant factors when making a downward adjustment in Ms. Eddleman’s requested attorney’s fee award, it is not clear that the court employed the factors in the appropriate manner. The district court has the discretion to weigh relevant factors. However, it may not substitute these factors for the lodestar calculation.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“The plaintiff’s lawyer was negligent, pure and simple. The plaintiff’s lawyer failed to do something that an attorney should do, and that is to elicit from her client testimony with regard to damages.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.