Whatley v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “I agree with the majority that the statutory definition of “youth program center” as a structure “that on a regular basis provides ... programs or services” for people under age eighteen turns only on the activities “provided” by the structure. I.C. § 35-41-1-29. But in nay view that definition must be confined to comply with basic principles of due process of law. Due process requires that a criminal statute give everyone reasonable notice of what is prohibited. Healthscript, Inc. v. State, 770 N.E.2d 810 , 818 (Ind. 2002). It also requires notice of the consequences of violation so the facts warranting the enhanced penalty at issue here are equally subject to the requirement of fair notice. United States v. Batehelder, 442 U.S. 114 , 123, 99 S.Ct. 2198 , 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); Coleman v. Ryan, 196 F.3d 793 , 797 (7th Cir. 1999) (“ ‘[T]he notice requirements of the Due Process Clause’ require that a criminal law ‘clearly define the conduct prohibited’ as well as ‘the punishment authorized.’ A statute is constitutionally defective if it ‘do[es] not state with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given criminal statute.’ ” (quoting Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 123 , 99 S.Ct. 2198 )); United States v. Samaniego-Rodriguez, 32 F.3d 242 , 244 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The fair notice requirement of the Due Process Clause is satisfied if the criminal statute clearly defines the conduct prohibited and the punishments authorized.”). I agree with the majority that there are many buil”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Whatley v. Zatecky

2. “Here, Whatley could have objectively discovered RCC’s status as a youth program center by observing young people entering and exiting the building on a regular basis — in fact, his residence faced RCC’s entrance. Whatley could have contacted RCC to inquire whether programs were offered for youth on a regular basis. And under Walker, it is of no import here that Whatley was unaware of the existence of a youth program center. It is, therefore, not dis-positive that RCC did not have a sign indicating it was a youth program center, or that Whatley did not realize that RCC regularly provided services and programs to young people; an objective observer could discern that the activities occurring at RCC qualified it as a youth program center by observing children entering and exiting the building on a regular basis or by contacting RCC to determine whether it offered programs to young people on a regular basis. The statute is not vague as applied to these facts.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Whatley v. Zatecky

3. “[On] March [20], 2008, Whatley was arrested at his home on a warrant issued in an unrelated case. During a search incident to arrest, the arresting officer discovered a bag containing 3.2459 grams of cocaine in Whatley's pocket. In relevant part, the State charged Whatley with possession of cocaine as a Class A felony. Possession of cocaine is ordinarily a Class C felony, but possession of three grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a youth program center elevates the offense to a Class A felony. Ind.Code § 35-48-4-6. Whatley's home, where the arrest occurred, was located approximately 795 feet from Robinson Community Church ("RCC").... The jury found that the enhancement was supported by the evidence and the court sentenced Whatley to a term of 35 years.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Whatley v. State