929 So. 2d 182 - State v. Brown’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “It is well settled that the standard for analyzing a defendant's claim that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated is the four factor test enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 [, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 ] (1972); to-wit: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. The first factor — the length of the delay — is often referred to as the "triggering mechanism" because unless the delay is "presumptively prejudicial," no further inquiry into the other Barker factors is required. Love , XXXX-XXXX at p. 16, 847 So.2d at 1210 . Furthermore, the circumstances of each individual case determine the weight to be ascribed to the length of the delay and the reason for the delay. [ State v.] Reaves , 376 So.2d [136] at 138 [(1979)]. Because the complexity of the particular case must be taken into consideration, a delay that is acceptable in one case may not be acceptable in another. Gray v. King, 724 F.2d 1199, 1202 (5th Cir.1984)(citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ). The manner of proof must also be considered, as must the gravity of the alleged crime. Id.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 937 So. 2d 419 - State v. Brown

2. “The State is correct that it has the authority to enter a nolle presequi and reinstate the charge. Both the Louisiana Supreme Court and this court have recognized this authority; however, the jurisprudence has also recognized that this authority may be overborne under the circumstances of any given case by the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial. State v. Love, XXXX-XXXX (La.5/23/03), 847 So.2d 1198 ; State v. Scott, XXXX-XXXX (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/27/05), 912 So.2d 843 . The State's authority to dismiss any prosecution without the consent of the court is recognized in La.C.Cr.P. art. 691. Under La.C.Cr.P. art. 576, the State is authorized to reinstitute the charges within six months of the dismissal. . . . The State, however, is required to show that the dismissal of the original prosecution was not for the purpose of avoiding the time limitations set by Article 578.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 937 So. 2d 419 - State v. Brown

3. “The State now argues that it had the authority to dismiss the original bill of information and reinstitute the charges in the present bill. It further argues that neither the defendant's statutory right nor his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated in this case.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 937 So. 2d 419 - State v. Brown