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← 929 SO2D 99 - State v. Kujawa

State v. Kujawa’s Empirical Analysis

2006

Citation profile

10
cited by 10 later decisions
2
states following
June 2010
most recently cited

10 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996) · 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (§ 101 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996)

Relies on Blockburger v. United States · Bell v. United States · Illinois v. Vitale · State v. Sepulvado · Rewis v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “A. Pornography involving juveniles is any of the following: . . . . (3) The intentional possession, sale, distribution, or possession with intent to sell or distribute of any photographs, films, videotapes, or other visual reproductions of any sexual performance involving a child under the age of seventeen.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “the same photographs, films, videotapes, or other visual representations”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “8 The legislative history provides no further guide to the meaning of these words. 10 See, e.g., State v. Howell, 169 N.C.App. 58 , 609 S.E.2d 417, 419 (2005), where a North Carolina appeals court found that the use of the plural in defining "material" (i.e. "material" defined as "pictures," "drawings," "video recordings," etc.) was merely a matter of style. In its brief, the state contends that the words "photographs, films, videotapes, or other visual reproductions" are qualified with the words "of a child" rather than "of any child." As such, the state asserts, it was the legislative intention that each visual reproduction of a different child is a separate crime. We do not find any significance in the use of the word "a" instead of "any" in the statute. The use of the words "a child" rather than " any child" does not, as asserted by the state, clarify legislative intent with regard to the proper unit of prosecution. The use of "a child" rather than "any child" is not a source of ambiguity. The central object of the statute does not relate to the terms "a child" or "any child," but rather to the possession of items containing child pornography. The proper focus, thus, is on the legislative intent in designating prohibited items using the plural form. The unit of prosecution refers to the offense proscribed by the statute, not the class of persons the statute protects. 11 An inherent difficulty with this approach is that the various provisions of the other states' laws do n”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.