State v. Taylor’s Empirical Analysis
1996
Citation profile
6 federal appellate · 140 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 148 later decisions — most recently June 2018 · most notably State v. Chaney (1998), Moss v. State (2000)
6 federal appellate · 140 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Boykin v. Alabama · American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v. United States · Soberon v. United States · Wayte v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 148 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“A prosecutor’s broad discretion does not extend to decisions deliberately based on unjustifiable standards such as race or some other entirely arbitrary factor. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 , 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1531 , 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985). To show an equal protection violation, [defendant] must prove both the prosecutor’s decision had a discriminatory effect on him and it was motivated by discriminatory purpose. Id. ‘Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been abused.’ McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 , 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1770 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987). Only one of [defendant’s allegations pertains to decisions made in his case. The Jackson County and Missouri studies, assuming arguendo they are valid and reliable, apply to discriminatory effect of decisions, but do no show purposeful discrimination or any effect on his case, specifically. ‘To prevail under the Equal Protection Clause [defendant] must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.’ Id. at 292 , 107 S.Ct. at 1767 (emphasis in original). ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ The allegation of discrimination specific to this case is the prosecutor’s refusal to exchange a recommendation of life without parole for [defendant]’s guilty plea to first degree murder. [Defendant] charges the race of defendant and victim must be the reason for the prosecutor’s decision. More likely, the unique ”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Brooks“Taylor also argues the plea was not knowingly made because he was not informed a jury could sentence him.... [Under section 565.006.2,] jury sentencing after a guilty plea [was] not a right for the defendant to waive, rather a privilege for the State to grant. Taylor did not waive sentencing by a jury because he could only obtain jury sentencing if the State agreed to it. The State did not agree; therefore, there was nothing of which to inform him. A knowing and voluntary plea does not require defendant be told details irrelevant to the decision at hand.... Failure to inform Taylor of the possibility of sentencing by a jury did not render his guilty plea unknowing or involuntary.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“that he would be sentenced by the same judge that accepted his plea, and deviation from the statute violates a liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the United States Constitution. The Missouri Supreme Court has determined that, as a matter of Missouri law, an accused is not entitled to withdraw a guilty plea as a matter of right and that the determining factor is”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Taylor v. Bowersox
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.