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93 Ill. 2d 222

443 N.E.2d 549

66 Ill.Dec. 623

In Re Lamberis

Illinois Supreme Court

Decided December 17, 1982

Illinois Supreme Court · decided 1982-12-17

Relies on 71 Ill. 2d 263 - In Re Saladino · 89 Ill. 2d 7 - In Re Feldman · 72 Ill. 2d 461 - In Re LaPinska

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1982-12-17

How this case has been cited

Cited by 37 later decisions — most recently January 2020 · most notably Attorney Grievance Commission v. Spery (2002), In Re Rosen (2008)

28 state decisions

15019821990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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JUSTICE UNDERWOOD,

¶1dissenting:

¶2Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion that respondent’s conduct warrants discipline, the censure imposed seems to me an inadequate response to the deliberate and deceitful nature of respondent’s conduct.

¶3While no two disciplinary cases are completely alike, “predictability and fairness require a degree of consistency in the selection of sanctions for similar types of misconduct.” (In re Saladino (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 263, 275. See In re Feldman (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 7.) Respondent’s action constituted a purposeful violation of the bar’s fundamental obligation of honesty, and cannot, in my judgment, be equated with the negligent commingling and conversion for which we censured the respondent in In re McLennon (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 215. Rather, the character of respondent’s misconduct more closely resembles a fraudulent misrepresentation which has customarily received a more severe sanction. See In re Nowak (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 279; In re March (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 382; In re Sherre (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 56.

¶4As noted by the majority, the reasons for which we impose discipline are “to maintain the integrity of the legal profession, to protect the administration of justice from reproach, and to safeguard the public.” (In re LaPinska (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 461, 473.) I think it clear that respondent’s intentional deceitfulness tends to bring the legal profession into disrepute and, although not perpetrated in the context of an attorney-client relationship, indirectly threatens the administration of justice by undermining public confidence in the integrity of officers of the court. In re March (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 382, 391; In re Abbamonto (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 93, 98.

¶5Because of the calculated nature of respondent’s misconduct some suspension seems to me necessary. Since the length of a suspension should bear a close relationship to the harm or risk of harm caused (In re Saladino (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 263, 276), and since respondent’s misconduct did not directly affect any other person, I would think a three-month suspension appropriate.

¶6JUSTICE MORAN joins in this dissent.

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