Nanson v. Jacob’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 56 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 60 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “‘ ‘ Common carriers, by reason of the nature of their business, which imperatively requires them- to receive and forward goods, when tendered in the usual course of their business, have long formed an exception to the stringency of general rules, in respect to what constitutes, in similar cases, a conversion. The authorities on this point are abundant. ... . “And where a person receives goods by delivery from one whom he is entitled to regard as the owner, and having so received them, conveys them to another, to whom they are sent, he does no tortious act. [Parker v. Godine, 2 Strange, 813.] “A conversion may be proved in three ways: (1) By a tortious taking; (2) by any use or appropriation to the use of the person in possession, indicating a claim of right in opposition to the rights of the owner; (3) by a refusal to give up possession to the owner on demand. ’ ’”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Atchison v. International Land & Investment Co. · 236 Mo. App. 1217 - Blackwell v. Laird and Laird

2. ““There was error committed in regard to the allowance of the claim presented, to the assignee of Jacob, in regard to the force and effect of said allowance. That allowance was, to all intents and purposes, a judgment, appealable from as such, and conclusive as such. The official record of the assignee shows positively that he refused to allow the claim on the basis of a conversion, but, allowed it as on account. The record of the assignee also shows that Jacob was adjudged by the assignee entitled to a reduction of two and a half per cent, commission on the hops, and the claim was then allowed (i. e. with such a deduction), and it was admitted on the trial that plaintiffs had received several thousand dollars on the allowed claim; and at that time the assigned estate of Jacob was still unsettled, and it did not appear what additional payment would be made on account of allowance. In such circumstances as the foregoing, thé conversion, if any had occurred, must be deemed as waived. Clearly, -the plaintiffs could not bave two strings to their bow, — could not ratify the act of Jacob, on the one hand, by haying their claim allowed in the ordinary way, with a deduction of commissions, and then, on the other hand, proceed as for a conversion. The two proceedings were entirely incompatible. The plaintiffs were put upon their election to choose which remedy they would pursue, and, having elected to go before the assignee as aforesaid, were necessarily precluded from any other or fur”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Richardson v. Olivier

3. ““It shall not hereafter be available to a party as an objection that no demand for the snbject-matter of a suit was made, prior to its institution, unless it is expressly set up by way of defense in the answer or replication, and is also accompanied with a tender of the amount that is due; in which case, if the plaintiff will further prosecute his suit, and shall not recover a greater sum than is tendered, he shall pay all costs. This provision shall be applicable as well to actions for property as for money; when property is tendered the damages for its detention, if any, shall also be tendered.” R. S. 1899, sec. 1575.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Bollman Bros. v. Peake