Volume 93 — Washington Reports

<p>COKPOBATIONS — DISSOLUTION ON INSOLVENCY — DISPOSITION OF ASSETS. Rem. 1915 Code, § 3715a, providing that a corporation whose name had been stricken for nonpayment of its license fees may hold a meeting of its stockholders and pass such resolutions as may be necessary to close out its affairs and wind up its business, modifies the former act, Rem. 1915 Code, § 3715d, providing that such a corporation is dissolved and the directors shall hold the property for the benefit of stockholders and creditors; and the stockholders may meet and dispose of all assets by a sale to another company assuming the indebtedness, in consideration of an exchange of its shares, and are not limited to the statutory procedure for a dissolution.</p> <p>Same — Dissolution on Insolvency — Sale oe Assets — Exchange of Stock — Minobity Stockholdebs — Assent. Minority stockholders of an insolvent corporation who assented or agreed to the acceptance of an exchange of stock in another corporation purchasing all the assets and assuming all the debts, cannot, two years later, be heard to object that the insolvent corporation had no power to wind up its affairs by such sale.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the superior court for Lewis county, D. F. Wright, J., entered August 11, 1916, dismissing an application for a writ of mandamus to compel the placing of relator’s name upon the ballot as a candidate for the nomination of superior judge.</p>

, entered May IS, 1915, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action to enforce a trust agreement, tried to the court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Sessions, J., entered June 11,1915, upon granting a nonsuit, dismissing an action for personal injuries sustained by an employee in using an elevator.</p>

<p>Mines and Minerals — Sale—Contracts—Construction—“Including.” In a contract for the sale of a mine under which the net profits were to be determined by deducting the actual expenses of the labor, “including” the wages of men, compensation for teams, cost of board, lodging, fuel and 25 cents per miner’s inch for water, the word “including” introduces an enlarging definition of the preceding general words “actual cost of labor,” but excludes further enlargement than that furnished by the enlarging clause; hence, does not include cost of materials or supplies such as shovels, picks and lumber.</p> <p>Same. Such clause does not authorize a charge for water at more than the specified rate for water used; notwithstanding the method of mining was changed from steam and low pressure water to high pressure water, increasing the amount of water used but lessening the cost of the operation, where the method was under the absolute control of the operator of the mine making the change.</p> <p>Same — Sale — Validity — Equity — Speculative Contract. The fact that a mine could not be worked at a profit without a change to the hydraulic method, greatly increasing the amount of water to be used and charged for at a specified rate in figuring the net profits, does not authorize a court of equity to grant relief on the theory that it would be unconscionable in an action for an accounting to enforce the contract; as the court cannot relieve from and nullify speculative contracts.</p> <p>Evidence — Parol to Vary Writing — Sueeiciency—Mining Contract. An oral modification of a mining contract with reference to the amount to be charged for water is not established where evidence of notice of the change was vague and contradicted and the other parties to the contract never agreed to pay the higher charge.</p> <p>Estoppel — In Pais — Silence—Prejudice. An estoppel to object to an increased charge for water used under a mining contract, upon changing to the hydraulic method, is not created by silence following the rendering of a statement of the profits showing the increased charges, where the statement was not rendered until more than half of all the expense had been incurred for high pressure water, and under the contract there was no right to make such increased charge; since the silence did not actually mislead the other party or operate as a fraud.</p> <p>Same — Burden of Proof. The burden of proving that silence, to create an estoppel operated as a fraud or was intended to mislead and would be acted upon, is upon the party invoking the estoppel.</p> <p>Account Stated — Acquiescence. The rendition of a statement of an account containing deductions does not create an account stated, though not objected to, where there was no right to make the deductions and no reasonable grounds for belief that the other party would rely or act upon silence or acquiescence.</p> <p>Contracts — Construction by Parties — Parol Evidence. Contemporaneous construction cannot be invoked by parol evidence as against the clear terms of an unambiguous written contract.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Ronald, J., entered April 10, 1915, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff by direction of the court, in an action on contract.</p>

, entered June 10, 1915, upon the verdict of a jury rendered' in favor of the plaintiff, in an action to recover the value of property sold under execution.

Appeal by plaintiffs from a judgment of the superior court for Yakima county, Grady, J., entered November 7, 1914, upon findings favorable to the plaintiffs, in an action of ejectment, tried to the court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Kitsap county, French, J., entered July 24, 1914, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action in tort.</p>

, entered September 30, 1915, dismissing an application for an allowance under the mothers’ pension act, after a hearing before the court.

<p>Fraudulent Conveyances — Preferences—Bill of Sale — Delivery —Change of Possession. Under a bill of sale by a debtor given as security, there is a sufficient delivery or change of possession of lumber piled in the vendor’s yards, as against a subsequent assignee for creditors, where the vendee’s agent came to the yard, looked it over with the vendor, who agreed he might take it, and the agent employed a man to take and haul it away.</p> <p>Chattel Mortgages — Sales—Validity —Recording —Change of Possession. Where a vendee in a bill of sale given as security takes possession of the property prior to the claims of other creditors, the bill of sale is not invalid because not accompanied by an affidavit of good faith or not properly recorded.</p>

<p>Witnesses — Competency—“Transaction With Person Since Deceased.” In an action by executors for money collected by defendant for tbe deceased, tbe defendant’s identification of deceased’s signature to receipts for money paid by defendant is not within Rem. 1915 Code, § 1211, excluding the testimony of a party in interest in his own behalf as “to any transaction had by him” with the deceased.</p> <p>Same. In such a case, the testimony of the defendant as to the existence and loss of a receipt signed by the deceased which was not produced is inadmissible as being testimony of “a transaction had with the deceased,” under the statute.</p> <p>Evidence — Documentary Evidence — Books op Account — “Shop-Book” — “Transaction With Person Since Deceased.” An account book, kept by defendant, a business man, showing only sums paid by him to plaintiff’s decedent at various dates, apparently all entered at the same time, and not kept in the ordinary course of defendant’s business, is not a “shop-book,” and is inadmissible, as it appears on its face to be a self-serving declaration, and an attempt to evade the statute excluding testimony of transactions had with the deceased.</p>

<p>Bills and Notes — Validity—Failure of Consideration. There is entire failure of consideration for a mortgage note given as part consideration for the price of land, where, by mutual agreement, the sale was rescinded and an assignee of the note was informed of that fact when he took the note and agreed, in its stead, to take the note of the vendor.</p> <p>Same. The fact that the vendor simply signed the purchaser’s note, which the parties had agreed to redeliver, and delivered it to the assignee, would not deprive the purchasers of the defense of failure of consideration.</p> <p>Same — Renunciation—Statutes—Application. Rem. 1915 Code, § 3512, providing that the holder of a negotiable instrument must renounce his rights in writing unless the instrument is delivered up has no application to a note for which the consideration failed, to the knowledge of the holder at the time he acquired it.</p> <p>Same — Action—Failure of Consideration — Oral Evidence — Admissibility. It is competent to show by oral proofs that the consideration for a note, given for the purchase price of land, had failed, to the knowledge of the holder, by a mutual rescission of the sale.</p>

, entered November 23, 1915, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action on a promissory note, tried to the court.

, entered September 8, 1915, granting a new trial after the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the defendant, in an action in tort.

<p>Fraud — Action—Measure oe Damages. The measure of damages for fraud inducing a trade of plaintiffs’ equity in certain lots must be based upon the market value of the plaintiffs’ equity in the lots, and not upon the market value of the lots.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Ralston, J., entered July 1, 1915, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action to cancel a tax, tried to the court.</p>

Application filed in the supreme court June 28, 1916, for a writ of prohibition to prevent the superior court for King county, Dykeman, J., from proceeding in a cause.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Chelan county, Grimshaw, J., entered January 14, 1915, upon findings in favor of the defendants, in an action on contract, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Adams county, Linn, J., entered May 5, 1915, upon granting a nonsuit, dismissing an action on contract and for equitable relief.</p>

<p>Cross-appeals from a judgment of the superior court for Adams county, Linn, J., entered May 8, 1915, in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for equitable relief, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Ferry county, Pendergast, J., entered June 10, 1915, upon a trial and conviction of manslaughter.</p>

Cross-appeals from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Frater, J., entered July 19, 1915, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, in consolidated actions to quiet title, tried to the court.

<p>Sales — Conditional Sales — Forfeiture—Waiver. Where plaintiff purchased an automobile for $1,220, paying $1,000 in cash, taking a conditional bill of sale and giving a note for the balance, and afterwards left the ear for resale with defendant, who offered to find some plan for disposing of the car so that plaintiff could get his money out of it, and plaintiff relied thereon, it is unconscionable to enforce a forfeiture, upon defendant’s repairing the car at a cost of $242, and selling it for $1,000, without any declaration of forfeiture.</p> <p>Equity — Maxims. A small item of $11.80 interest on a repair bill, that possibly was offset against other items involved, may be disregarded on the principle of de minimus non curat lex.</p>

, entered October 5, 1915, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for damages to property, tried to the court.

, entered September 20, 1915, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action to establish a boundary line, tried to the court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Sullivan, J., entered June 18, 1915, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action in tort.</p>

<p>Vendor and Purchaser — Contracts—Assumption oe Mortgage— Payment oe Purchase Price. Where, upon the sale of lots, the price was fixed at $20,000, and was to be paid by the assumption of local improvement liens, the assumption of mortgages, the conveyance of a lot, and the balance in cash, without any agreement to pay the $20,000 in any event, and there was nothing to indicate that the vendee, in meeting the incumbrances, was acting as agent of his vendor, the vendor cannot recover of the vendee a portion of the mortgage indebtedness which the vendee was not required to pay.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Walla Walla county, Mills, J., entered July 21, 1915, in favor of the defendants, in an action for equitable relief, tried to the court.</p>

, entered April 7, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the defendant, in an action for personal injuries caused by a defective sidewalk.

<p>Appeal — Record—Sufficiency. The opening statement of counsel, containing admissions on which the defendants had first moved for judgment, is immaterial, and need not be brought up on appeal, where defendants were allowed to withdraw their answer and file a demurrer to the complaint, which was sustained and the action dismissed.</p> <p>Eminent Domain — Taking or “Damaging” of Private Property— Compensation — Garbage Plants. The erection and maintenance by a city of an incinerator for the burning of garbage on land adjacent to that of a private owner in such manner as to depreciate the value of his land and render it a menace to health, constitutes a “damaging of private property for a public use,” within Const., art. 1, § 16, forbidding such damaging without first making compensation therefor, when the damage did not result from any negligence of the city, even though the operation of such a plant is a proper governmental function granted by legislative act.</p> <p>Same — “Damaging Property” — Municipal Corporations — Nuisance — Liability for Negligence. Rem. 1915 Code, § 8005, authorizing the installation of plants for the disposal of garbage and Id., § 8311, providing that nothing done or maintained under the express authority of statute can be deemed a nuisance, does not defeat recovery for damaging private property without just compensation by the erection and maintenance of a garbage plant, although the city is not liable on the theory of tort for negligent operation in such manner as to create a nuisance.</p>

, entered October 8, 1915, dismissing with prejudice an action for personal injuries, upon sustaining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, after a trial to the court on the merits.

<p>Contracts — Building Contracts — -Provision for Arbitration and Notice — “Other Contractors.” The disputes of a general contractor with his materialmen and subcontractors are not submitted to the arbitration of the architects by a contract for the construction of a school building reciting that the heating, plumbing, electric work, painting and general excavation will be let in separate contracts and not included in the general contract, and providing that the general contractors shall allow space to contractors for parts of the work not included in the general contract and that the contractors are to work in harmony and their differences settled by the architects, where the clause in question provided that, should any contractor or subcontractor claim damages on account of the delay or negligence of other contractors, he must give written notice of the claim to the architects for adjustment etc.; since the same has application only to “other contractors” “not included in the general contract,” and hence does not require notice of claim for damages by the general contractor on account of the delay of a subcontractor furnishing him mill work on the general contract.</p> <p>Same — Performance or Breach — Delay — Damages — Offset— Overhead Charges. In a subcontractor’s action against a contractor, overhead charges for salaries during the period of delay through plaintiff’s failure to perform on time will not be allowed as a set-off, where it appears that the general contractor’s other work was not finished during that time and that the overhead charges would have been continued and incurred in any event.</p> <p>Same — Performance or Breach- — Delay—Damages — Evidence — Sufficiency. The conclusion of witnesses that there was a twenty-five per cent loss in efficiency in installing mill work in a school building through delay in furnishing the mill work is not warranted by the fact that ten to fifteen carpenters were laid off at various times by reason of the delay, it appearing that the contractor was not put to the expense of carrying the carpenters when laid off.</p> <p>Same — Performance or Breach — Damages—Offset.' The cost oí handling and refinishing defective mill work rejected by the inspectors, is a proper element of damages to be offset against the claim of a subcontractor furnishing the mill work.</p> <p>Same — Performance or Breach — Delay — Damages — Interest. Interest on money borrowed by a contractor during the time his work was held up by the delay of a subcontractor is a proper element of damages to be offset against the subcontractor’s claim.</p>

, entered February 19, 1915, dismissing an action for the reinstatement of a discharged civil service employee, tried to the court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Webster, J., entered November 12, 1915, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action to quiet title, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Okanogan county, Pendergast, J., entered May 7, 1915, upon sustaining demurrers to the complaint, dismissing an action for wrongful eviction, tried to the court.</p>

, entered October 23, 1915, denying relief against certain defendants, in an action to foreclose a chattel mortgage, tried to the court.

<p>Commerce — “Interstate Commerce” — What Constitutes. The initial movement of a refrigerator ear for icing incident to its loading and billing to a point outside the state is a service rendered in the movement of interstate commerce within the Federal employers’ liability act.</p> <p>Master and Servant — 1Injury to Servant — Negligence—Federal Liability Act — Safety Appliance Act. Where an accident in interstate commerce occurred through the master’s negligence, the Federal employers’ liability act defines the rights of the employee and the rights of the parties depend upon it and not upon the safety appliance act.</p> <p>Same — Injury to Servant — Actions — Issues and Proof — Negligence. Upon an issue as to whether cars were in a train movement without having the air coupled as required by the safety appliance act, the absence of markers required on the rear of trains does not tend to show that it was a train movement.</p> <p>Same. Upon an allegation of negligence in releasing the air brakes on a switch engine after it had come to a stop, whereupon the momentum of the cars shoved the engine onto the plaintiff, it is inadmissible to prove a rule requiring all trains to carry markers or green flags and that flags were not displayed, since that was an independent act of negligence which in no way contributed to the injury.</p> <p>Same. Upon- an issue as to whether cars were in a train movement without having the air coupled as required in the safety appliance act, it is inadmissible to prove that the company issued a train bulletin for another division after the accident requiring cars moved between certain points in such other division to be coupled with air.</p> <p>Same. Upon such issue it is inadmissible to prove a rule requiring “train pipes to be connected,” the fact being admitted that the pipes were not connected.</p> <p>Same — Issues and Proof — Opinions—Rebuttal. Upon an allegation of negligence in releasing the air brakes on a switch engine after it had come to a stop, whereupon the momentum of the cars shoved the engine onto the plaintiff, it is reversible error to allow the plaintiff in rebuttal to testify that something else might have intervened, as a leaky valve or the application of steam, to start up the engine after release of the air; since it was not within the issues, and was speculative and merely the opinion of a nonexpert; and furthermore not proper rebuttal.</p>

, entered July 6, 1915, upon findings in favor of the defendants, in an action to foreclose a mortgage, tried to the court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Huneke, J., entered January 12, 1915, dismissing an action for an accounting, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Municipal Corporations — Sidewalks—-Trapdoors — Negligence— Evidence — Question for Jury. Negligence in tbe maintenance of a trapdoor in a sidewalk is a question for tbe jury where there was evidence to the effect that the doors sagged down under the weight of a person, so that plaintiff’s toe was caught under the edge of the door and she was tripped and fell and broke her leg.</p> <p>New Trial — Misconduct of Counsel — -Prejudice. A new trial for misconduct of counsel in argument in making statements outside the record was properly refused, where the jury were instructed to disregard them, they were not of such a character as to prejudice the jury, and the size of the verdict did not indicate passion or prejudice.</p>

<p>Appeal — Notice—Parties to Be Served — Sureties on Plaintiff's Cost Bond — Dismissal. Where plaintiff, on defendant’s demand, gave a bond for costs, and secured a verdict, and defendant appealed, the failure of the defendant to serve notice of appeal upon the sureties on the cost bond will not work a dismissal of the appeal, where defendant waives all rights against the sureties on the cost bond.</p>

<p>Appeal — Notice—Parties to Be Served — -Sureties on Plaintiff's Cost Bond. In an action brought by a nonresident plaintiff furnishing a bond for costs, in which judgment went for defendant but was not entered against the sureties on the cost bond, the sureties are not parties “similarly affected-by the judgment or order appealed from” within Rem. 1915 Code, § 1720, and hence need not be served with notice of plaintiff’s appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Mackintosh, J., entered December SI, 1915, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial before the court and an advisory jury.</p>

<p>Certiorari to review a judgment of the superior court for King county, Gilliam, J., entered October 18, 1916, denying a writ of mandamus to compel the placing of relators’ names upon the general election ballots as nominees for the office of superior judge.</p>

Application filed in the supreme court October 26, 1916, for a writ of mandamus to compel the secretary of state to certify the relator’s name as a nominee for the office of supreme judge.

Wright, J., entered October 18, 1916, enjoining the expenditure of funds of the port commission for political purposes, after a hearing before the court.

, entered January 20, 1915, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a lineman through the breaking of a telephone pole.

<p>Appeal — Review—Theory of Trial — Objections Below. Where the answer was treated at the trial as denying the allegation of negligence in a certain paragraph, it cannot be claimed for the first time on appeal that the same had been admitted by failing to deny such paragraph.</p> <p>Discovery — Interrogatories — Refusal to Answer — Penalty—, Statutes — Harmless Error. Under Rem 1915 Code, § 1230, providing for the striking of the offending party’s pleading for refusing to answer interrogatories and the rendition of judgment against' him, it is not error to deny a motion for judgment at the trial for such refusal, where the moving party did not bring himself within the statute by moving to strike the pleading and the offending party was required to file an answer to the interrogatory before any evidence was introduced, and the failure to answer it earlier had no prejudicial effect.</p> <p>Electricity — Action for Injuries — Electric Shock — Proximate Cause — Question for Jury. In an action for injuries sustained through an electric shock, shortly after a stroke of lightning had broken defendant’s high voltage transmission wires, whether the injury was caused by the act of the defendant in again charging the wires shortly after the shock, is for the jury, where experts expressed the view that a wet cross arm, upon which the broken wire rested, was a sufficient conductor to carry the excessive charge over the distribution wires to plaintiff’s house and cause plaintiff’s injury, although the same was disputed and there was vague evidence of a second stroke of lightning.</p> <p>Same — Action for Injuries — Electric Shock — Negligence— Question for Jury. In an action for injuries through receiving an electric shock, after a break in the defendant’s high voltage line, when defendant again turned on the current to test out the line, the negligence of the defendant is a question for the jury, where all the experts testified that the only practicable method of locating the trouble was to turn on about one-half of the normal voltage, and defendant’s witness in charge of the power house, who. was the only person who could testify on the subject, contradicted himself, first testifying that he turned on the full voltage and repeated it on cross-examination, but finally reduced it to less than half the normal voltage; especially where the defendant’s answer to an interrogatory showed that the line was charged with normal voltage.</p> <p>Same — Action fob Damages — Negligent Constbuction — Evidence —Statutes. Compliance with Rem. 1915 Code, § 4976-1, prescribing certain rules for the construction of electrical lines, is not evidence of proper construction except in the particulars covered by the statute; and does not cover the necessity of using lightning arresters over transformers on poles carrying high voltage wires so as to prevent excessive current entering premises on distribution lines in case of a stroke of lightning.</p>

, entered September 14, 1915, upon findings in favor of the intervener, adjudging the right to money impounded in garnishment proceedings, tried to the court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for What-com county, Hardin, J., entered June 1, 1915, upon findings in favor of the defendant, in an action of replevin, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Ronald, J., entered December 14, 1915, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action in tort.</p>

, entered February 26, 1916, refusing to tax costs against the contestees of a will, upon approving the final account of an administratrix, after a hearing before the court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Kennan, J., entered November 26, 1915, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action to quiet title, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Taxation — Tax Deed — Actions to Set Aside — Limitation. An action to quiet title to land sold for taxes on the ground that the tax judgment was void for want of valid process, is governed by-Rem. 1915 Code, § 162, limiting actions to cancel a tax deed or recover lands sold for taxes to three years from the date of the issuance of the tax deed.</p>

<p>Waters and Water Courses- — -Irrigation—Contracts — Reservation op Lien — Foreclosure. A contract by an irrigation company to furnish water may, irrespective of statutory authorization, create a lien in the nature of a mortgage upon the water right granted to secure all sums that may be due under the contract; and, upon any default, the same is enforcible in an action in equity to foreclose the mortgage or discharge the lien by sale of the land and water right.</p> <p>Same — Irrigation—Contract—Actions—Enforcement of Lien- — - Tender of Deed. In such an action, it is unnecessary that the company tender a water deed before action, where it is alleged that it would be vain, the grantee was in default, and the foreclosure decree and sale protected the grantees, allowing them a year for redemption.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Blake, J., entered January 5, 1915, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action on a promissory note and to foreclose a mortgage, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Divorcíe — Custody of Children — Modification—Suit Money — Allowance After Decree. Rem. 1915 Code, § 988, authorizing suit money pending an action for divorce, presupposes the existence of the marital relation; and after a divorce is granted, settling property rights and the custody of the child, the court cannot, upon the father’s application for modification of the decree respecting the child’s custody, require the payment of suit money and attorney’s fees to aid the mother in her defense to the motion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Review—New Teial — Discretion. Where the evidence is conflicting, the refusal of the trial court to grant a new trial on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence will not be reviewed except for abuse of discretion; and it is not an abuse of discretion where there was substantial evidence upon which to rest the verdict.</p> <p>Insurance — Mutual Benefit Certificates — Actions — Proof of Death- — Conclusiveness of Statements. In an action upon a mutual benefit certificate, the statements in the proofs of death are not conclusive on the beneficiary, in the absence of facts creating an estoppel.</p> <p>Evidence — Hearsay Evidence — Recitals in Records of Marriage License — Fact of Age. Where, by the statute of a sister state, the recorder had no fight to issue a marriage license to a male person under twenty-one without the consent provided for and it was his duty to make a record of the fact, a certified copy of a marriage license, tending to support a claim that an insured person was then over twenty-one years of age, is admissible in evidence upon the question of his age, for what it was worth, constituting a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.</p> <p>Evidence — Declarations of Insured — Admission Against Beneficiary. The declarations of the insured as to his age are, in actions upon mutual benefit insurance, admissible against the beneficiary.</p>

<p>Bills and Notes — Bona Fide Holder — Duties—Evidence—Sueeiciency. There can be no imputation of bad faith from the fact of taking negotiable paper, fair on its face, without active inquiry, nor by mere speculation as to diligence or negligence, and evidence going no further, and showing no actual notice, is insufficient to sustain findings that plaintiff was not a bona fide purchaser for value.</p> <p>Same — Bona Fide Purchaser — Collateral Executory Agreement —Notice—“Defective” Title. Where defendant gave a note for the full purchase price of an automobile, with a collateral executory agreement that the valuation of his old car, traded in at the time, instead of being then credited, should be applied in part payment of the note sixty days hence, the plain purpose was to enable the seller to raise money on the note, and knowledge thereof would not charge a purchaser with bad faith or make his title “defective” under Rem. 1915 Code, § 3446; since he did not obtain it by fraud, duress, unlawful means or for illegal consideration nor pledge it in breach of faith, no breach of the executory agreement having occurred.</p> <p>Same — Bona Fide Holder — Amount of Recovery — Discount. Under Rem. 1915 Code, § 3418, declaring that, where the holder has a lien on the instrument, he is deemed a holder for value to the extent of the lien, a bank taking a note as collateral to a loan for eighty per cent of its face, can recover from the maker, having a good defense as against the payee, only to the extent of the lien, with interest at the legal rate, in the absence of any evidence as to the rate of interest agreed upon.</p>

<p>Libel and Slander — Words Libelous Per Se — Injury to Business — Statutes. Billboard posters, printed in red ink, stating that theaters employing incompetent help are dangerous, those employing competent help display a union card, and that plaintiff’s theater cannot display such card, are libelous per se, within the definition of libel in Rem. 1915 Code, § 2424, relating to publications that injure a person in his business or occupation.</p> <p>Same — Libel Per Se — Damages—Loss or Patronage — Evidence. Where a publication is libelous per se as injuring one’s business, a recovery of substantial damages is sustained by proof of loss of patronage without other evidence of the amount of damages.</p>

, entered November 2, 1915, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action to recover a broker’s commission.

, entered December 27, 1915, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action on a promissory note, tried to the court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Grays Harbor county, Irwin, J., entered January 15, 1916, in favor of the plaintiff, up on overruling a motion to quash the service of summons, in an action on a promissory note.</p>

Cross-appeals from a judgment of the superior court for Klickitat county, Back, J., entered September 20, 1915, in favor of the defendant, in an action for an injunction and for damages, tried to the court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Whitman county, McCroskey, J., entered June 11, 1915, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action on contract.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Sullivan, J., entered June 8, 1915, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by an employee in a mine.</p>

Cross-appeals from a judgment of the superior court for Lewis county, Rice, J., entered July 26, 1915, upon findings favorable in part to both parties, in mandamus proceedings to require the payment of city warrants, tried to the court.

<p>Cross-appeals from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Dykeman, J., entered November 20, 1915, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff as against one defendant, in an action on contract, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Adverse Possession — Payment op Taxes — Color op Title — Statutes. Tbe payment of taxes in good faith, by one claiming under a warranty deed from the owners in 1889, for seven consecutive years after title had passed by tax deed in 1903 to another, is a payment by a person having “color of title, made in good faith” within Rem. 1915 Code, § 789, providing that such payment shall vest title in vacant and unoccupied land to the extent and according to the purport of the paper title.</p>

, entered January 15, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by an employee in falling from a scaffold.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Webster, J., entered January 18, 1916, dismissing an action to enjoin a public improvement, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Eminent Domain — Compensation Before Taking — Waiver—Injunction — Remedy in Damages. Where by consent entry upon land was made for the construction of a railroad under a verbal agreement as to the compensation, and the grade was completed and the right of way fenced off, with no steps taken to recover possession for two years, the owner waived his constitutional right to compensation in advance; hence injunction does not lie to restrain further work until compensation is made, but the owner is relegated to his action in damages.</p>

Application filed in the supreme court September 26, 1916, for a writ of mandamus to compel the superior court for Stevens county, Jackson, J., to enter a judgment.

<p>Intoxicating Liquors — Prohibition — Statutes — Construction. Rem. 1915 Code, § 6262-1 providing that tbe state wide prohibition law shall be liberally construed as an exercise of the police power for the protection of the economic welfare, health, peace and morals of the people precludes a strict construction thereof as a penal statute.</p> <p>Same — Prohibition—Police Power — Nonintoxicating Beverages. In the exercise of the police power, the legislature or the people in prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors may prohibit the sale of nonintoxicating beverages, and may conclusively define such beverages as intoxicating liquors, within the meaning of the prohibition act, whenever that course has any reasonable relation to the accomplishment of the dominant purpose.</p> <p>Same — Prohibition—Statutes—-“Liquors.” The term “liquor” in the prohibition law does not, ex vi termini, mean an alcoholic or intoxicating liquid.</p> <p>Same — Prohibition — Statutes — “Any Other Intoxicating Liquors” — Ejusdem Generis. Under Rem. 1915 Code, § 6262-2, defining intoxicating liquor to include whiskey, brandy, gin, rum, wine, ale, beer, and any spirituous, vinous, fermented or malt liquor, “and every other liquor or liquid containing intoxicating properties,” the words “and every other,” etc., do not limit the act to “intoxicating liquors,” but adds to the things specifically enumerated; hence the act includes “malt,” liquors that are not intoxicating, and the rule of ejusdem generis has no application.</p> <p>Same — Pbohibition—Pbosecution—Intoxicating Qualities — Presumption and Peooe. Under the state wide prohibition act, Rem. 1915 Code, §6262-2, defining intoxicating liquors, the liquors enumeráted by name are conclusively presumed to be intoxicating, and as to “any other intoxicating liquors” capable of being used as a beverage, the intoxicating quality must be proved.</p> <p>Same — Prohibition- — Statutes — “Malt Liquors.” The words “malt liquors,” in Rem. 1915 Code, § 6262-2, are not used in a technical sense, but mean, as defined in the standard dictionaries, an alcoholic and fermented liquor brewed from malt and do not include a nonalcoholic or nonfermented liquor containing “malt.”</p>

, entered May 25, 1915, dismissing an application for a writ of mandamus to compel the payment of an insurance benefit under the fireman’s pension act, after a hearing before the court.

<p>Municipal Corporations — Public Improvements — Assessments— Benefits — Review. The action of eminent domain commissioners in assessing property for benefits from improvements more than a mile distant will not be disturbed on appeal where the evidence as to the fact of benefits was conflicting; as that was a question of fact which cannot be reversed except in case of fraud, mistake or arbitrary action amounting to an abuse of discretion.</p> <p>Same — Public Improvements •— Ordinance — Implied Repeal — Eminent Domain — Abandonment of Proceedings. Where, after the passage of an ordinance for a street improvement and condemnation and award thereunder, the city passed a second ordinance providing for an additional widening of one of the streets and a different system of grades but condemnation proceedings thereunder were abandoned, the second ordinance does not repeal the first ordinance by implication, where there was no such intention, and the two months within which the city could abandon the first condemnation under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 7816, had expired before the second ordinance was passed.</p> <p>Same — Public Improvements — Assessment — State Lands — Statutes — “Local Improvements.” Rem. 1915 Code, § 6875, providing that all city lands of the state except tide lands may be assessed for the cost of local improvements specially benefiting the same, authorizes an assessment for street improvements against a state armory site situated on upland in a city; “local improvement” including improvements made upon streets and not upon the land itself.</p> <p>Same — Public Impbovements — Assessment—Notice. Under Rem. 1915 Code, § 6877, providing that no city shall have jurisdiction to make a local improvement or levy an assessment against state lands until notice of the making of such proposed improvement and the fixing of the time for hearing and confirming the same he served upon the state land commissioner, it is sufficient that notice was given when it was determined that the state land was specially benefited and the state appeared and was heard in opposition to the assessment.</p>

, entered May 4, 1915, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, for personal injuries sustained by a passenger on a street car.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, B.onald, J., entered September % 1915, upon a trial and conviction of practicing medicine without a license.</p>

<p>Abatement and Revival — Another Action Pending. A subsequent suit cannot be pleaded in abatement of a prior action for the same cause.</p> <p>Actions — Joinder—Splitting Causes of Action — Waiver of Objection — Effect—Judgment—Bar. Where defendants submitted to the trial of a second action before trial of a prior action growing out of the same transaction, without moving for a consolidation and without raising any objection to the splitting of causes of action by the two suits, they waived the right to object and cannot plead the judgment in the second action as a bar to judgment in the first action, as to matters not actually tried and decided in the second action (overruling, on rehearing, Id., 90 Wash. 369).</p> <p>Judgment — Bar — Res Judicata — Matters Concluded. Where plaintiff, defrauded by defendants in a deal for lands, began two actions, the first to recover damages for the fraud, and the second asking cancellation of their deed for the same fraud without asking any money judgment, judgment in the second action, which was first tried, granting cancellation, is res judicata only of the matters actually tried and decided, and cannot be pleaded in bar of a money judgment in the first action, the defendants having failed to move for a consolidation of the actions or to object to the splitting of plaintiff’s cause of action (overruling, on rehearing, Id., 90 Wash. 369).</p> <p>Same. In the subsequent trial of the first action, it was not error to refuse the defendants the right to relitigate the issue of fraud, which was the only issue decided by the prior judgment in the second suit.</p>

, entered June 22, 1914, upon findings in favor of the interveners, dismissing proceedings to condemn property for street purposes, after a trial and hearing on objections to the assessment roll.

county, Kauffman, J., entered August 16,1915, upon findings in favor of defendants, in an action for equitable relief, tried to the court.

<p>Release and Discharge — Damages Included — Injuries to Servant — Malpractice op Physician. Malpractice by an attending physician, in a case in wbicb the master was liable for the original injury, being one of the probable consequences of the injury for which the master is liable whether furnishing the physician or not, a release of all damages, given to the master in full settlement of any and all claims of every kind, operates to discharge a physician furnished by the master, and precludes an action against the physician for malpractice in treating the injury and carelessly aggravating the damages (Ellis, J., dissenting).</p>

, entered May 12, 1915, in favor of the defendants, notwithstanding the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a riveter in bridge construction.

<p>Statutes — Construction—“Worker.” A stenographer and bookkeeper is a “worker” within the meaning of initiative measure No. 8 (Rem. 1915 Code, § 6565-1 et seq.) making it unlawful for employment agencies to charge a fee or remuneration for furnishing employment to “workers.”</p> <p>Same- — Validity'—Definiteness—“Workers.” The word “worker” in initiative measure No. 8 (Rem. 1915 Code, § 6565-1 et seq.) making it unlawful for employment agencies to charge a fee, or remuneration for furnishing employment to “workers,” is not so indefinite as to render the act void or so wanting in certainty that it could not support a criminal charge for its violation.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Police Power — Regulation of Business— Employment Agencies. It is within, the police power of the state to prohibit employment agencies from charging any fee or remuneration for furnishing employment to workers, and initiative measure No. 8 (Rem. 1915 Code, § 6565-1 et seq.) is therefore not unconstitutional as in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Federal constitution.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Lewis county, Rice, J., entered February lé, 1916, upon a trial and conviction of adultery.</p>

<p>Factors- — Commissions—Contract—Evidence—Findings. Where parties disagreed as to the terms of a special contract for the sale of goods on commission, the fact that the court did not find the contract exactly as claimed by either party, but adopted the testimony of each in part, does not amount to a finding that there was no meeting of the minds upon any definite contract.</p> <p>Same — Authority — Employing Subagents. A factor operating under an express contract to market fruit for a commission has no power to employ subagents at the owner’s expense and deduct their commissions, and the power is not implied from the mere fact of employment.</p> <p>Same — Commissions—Contract—Evidence — Sufficiency. Findings that fruit was to be marketed for a specified commission, without deductions for the commissions of subagents in the east, are sustained where that version of the contract was corroborated by the fact that the amount of such deductions was not agreed upon when the contract was made, and that both the fact and the amount of the deductions made were persistently concealed in making statements of all the other expenses incurred.</p>

<p>Corporations — Stock—Sale — Rescission — Fraud — Evidence — Sufficiency. A rescission of sale of stock for fraud is properly refused where it is not shown by clear and convincing evidence that plaintiffs were overreached in a business venture which they believed would be successful after full opportunity to investigate and after full inquiry.</p> <p>Same — Capital Stock — Impairment — Gift to Corporation — Validity. Where promoters of a corporation had received all of the stock as fully paid up in consideration of rights and property transferred to the corporation, they may lawfully make a gift of part of the stock to the corporation to be sold for its benefit as treasury stock; and such return of stock is not void as an impairment of the capital stock in violation of Rem. 1915 Code, § 3697.</p> <p>Same — Sale of Stock — Rescission — Fraud — Evidence — Sufficiency. Evidence that a company failed to meet its expectations as to the practicability and salability of a machine does not warrant a finding of fraud in the sale of stock, where there was other evidence that the machines were practicable and that the failure of the company was due to want of sufficient working capital.</p>

, entered March 15, 1915, in favor of the defendants, dismissing an action to determine conflicting claims to the waters of a stream.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Lewis county, Rice, J., entered October 29, 1915, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action on</p> <p>contract.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Grays Harbor county, Sheeks, J., entered February 29, 1916, upon findings in favor of the defendant, in an action for money received, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Cross-appeals from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Dykeman, J., entered July 6, 1915, in favor of the defendant, in an action by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover damages for fraud, and for an accounting, tried to the court.</p>

, entered May 19, 1915, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, for personal injuries sustained by one employed as a swamper in a logging crew.

<p>Municipal Cobpobations — Improvements — Contracts — Decision op City Engineer — Arbitrariness. A provision in a city contract making the decision of the city engineer final and conclusive as to the amount of work to be paid for under the contract, is not binding where it appears that it was so manifestly erroneous as to be arbitrary and capricious, and will be disregarded by the courts.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Thurs-ton county, Mitchell, J., entered March 13, 1916, dismissing an action for an accounting, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint.</p>

, entered December 14, 1915, in favor of creditors of an estate, upon a hearing upon objections to the final account and distribution by the administrator.

<p>Cross-appeals from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Mackintosh, J., entered January 4, 1916, upon a trial and conviction of violating the jitney bus act, upon sustaining a demurrer on behalf of the individual defendants, and a trial to the court as to the defendant corporation.</p>

<p>Landlord and Tenant — Unlawful Detainer — Parties — Mechanics’ Lien Claimants. Under Rem. 1915 Code, § 816, providing that no person other than the tenant or subtenant in actual possession need be made a party defendant in an action of unlawful detainer, and §§ 827, 830, providing for relief against the judgment by those claiming under or through the tenant, a person claiming a mechanics’ lien against the interest of the tenant need not be made a party, and is nevertheless bound by the judgment as being in privity with the tenant.</p> <p>Same — Statutes—Validity. Such statute, compelling the lien claimants claiming through the tenant to seek relief under the statute, is valid.</p> <p>Same — Unlawful Detainer — Judgment—Relief From — Limitations — Statutes. Such act, in providing that the right to relief against the judgment of unlawful detainer “may” be exercised within a limited time, is not merely permissive, but precludes the idea that it can be exercised at some later time.</p> <p>Pleading — Denials—Matters of Record. A denial on information and belief of matters that are of public record is bad.</p> <p>Appeal — Review—Harmless Error. Error cannot be predicated upon striking from a complaint matters of detail that were not material to the cause of action where their elimination left a sufficient statement of material matters to constitute a cause of action.</p> <p>Mechanics’ Liens — Foreclosure—Pleading—Variance — Amendment. Where a claim of mechanics’ lien sought to charge the fee of the property, and the complaint was based on the theory that it was a charge upon a leasehold interest, there was such a fatal variance as to require an amendment of the lien or of the complaint.</p> <p>Appeal — Review—Harmless Error. Where some form of an amendment of a pleading was required, error in ruling upon a preliminary motion is harmless.</p> <p>Mechanics’ Liens — Foreclosure — Amendment of Lien. In- an action to foreclose a mechanics’ lien, an amendment of the lien so as to charge only a leasehold interest will not avail the plaintiff where it appears that the leasehold has been forfeited under a judgment in unlawful detainer.</p>

<p>Appeal — Dismissal—Abstract—Sufficiency. Under Rem. 1915 Code, § 1730-6, insufficiency of the abstract of the evidence or of its index is not ground for dismissal of the appeal, but only for motion to amend the abstract, upon terms.</p> <p>Appeal — Record—Supplemental Abstract. A supplemental transcript containing matters not introduced in evidence and in no way material to the appeal will be struck out on motion.</p> <p>Same. Where the appellants’ abstract on appeal is deemed insufficient, the respondent is privileged to file a supplemental abstract, even if it goes over the same ground; and if it be too full, the remedy is by motion to correct it, and not to strike.</p> <p>Carriers — Off Passengers — Elevators—Negligence — Evidence— Sufficiency. Evidence that a child entered an elevator holding its mother’s hand and that the elevator started quickly with a sudden movement before the child had fairly entered, and that he fell to the floor of the cage, toward the open door and was caught by a projecting floor or mechanism of a projecting indicator over the door, warrants a finding of negligence in the operation and maintenance of the elevator; it being negligence to leave projecting floors or mechanism in the elevator well and at the same time operate the elevator cage with an open door.</p> <p>Death — Damages—Infant—Evidence—Admissibility. In an action for the death of a minor child, evidence of the earning power of the child during minority is admissible.</p> <p>Evidence — Opinion Evidence — Experts—Qualification—Admissibility. Upon an issue as to the earning power of a minor child, the qualification of the witness to testify as an expert as to the cost of rearing and educating the child is largely a matter of discretion, and the ruling will not be disturbed except for manifest abuse of discretion.</p> <p>Death — Measure of Damages — Excessive Damages. A verdict for $3,576 for the wrongful death of a son, four years of age, will not be held excessive, in the absence of an affirmative showing of passion or prejudice; since substantial damages may be awarded.</p>

, entered July 16, 1915, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action to recover money advanced to a contractor on public work, tried to the court.

<p>Patents — Sale of Invention — Failure of Consideration. Notes given for a valueless unpatentable device, upon representations that it was valuable and patentable, are without consideration.</p> <p>Same — Sale—Consideration—Estoppel. A purchaser of a mechanical device who was not a mechanician is not estopped to assert want of consideration by the fact that he made his own investigations and inquiries before purchasing, where it appears that he relied upon the seller’s statements that it was valuable and patentable rather than upon opinions of those of mechanical knowledge who examined it casually and believed it impracticable.</p>

<p>Fixtures — Landlord and Tenant — Trade Fixtures. Under a fifteen-year lease of premises upon which the lessee agreed to erect a theater building to cost not less than a certain sum, and to pay a fixed rental for the term, the usual furnishings, which were not mentioned in the lease, such as removable electric fixtures, opera chairs, picture machines and screen, carpets and furnishings for the ladies' dressing room, of a perishable nature, are not fixtures.</p> <p>Same. A clause in such a lease requiring the lessee to yield up the premises in a “good tenantable condition” does not contemplate that the building should be furnished for any particular purpose, so as to make such furnishings fixtures.</p> <p>Same. The fact that the building was constructed for a particular purpose and specially to receive the very furnishings installed, which were suitable only for this particular building or type of building, does not make the furnishings fixtures.</p> <p>Same — Landlord and Tenant — Trade Fixtures — Intent — Evidence. Whether fixtures become part of the freehold or are trade fixtures, removable by the tenant, depends upon the intent of the parties, to be inferred, when not determined by express agreement, from the nature of the article affixed, the relation and situation of the freehold after annexation, the manner and purpose of the annexation, considered in the light of the ordinary rules applicable to landlord and tenant.</p> <p>Same- — -Annexation — Presumptions. As between landlord and tenant, the presumption is that the tenant did not intend to enrich the freehold by annexing fixtures.</p> <p>Same — Landlord and Tenant — Trade Fixtures — Annexation — ' Removal — Evidence. Opera chairs and a vacuum cleaner, placed in a theater building by a tenant, and purchased under conditional sales contracts, are not fixtures that become part of the freehold, in view of the presumption that they are trade fixtures.</p> <p>Same. The same is true of a pipe organ manufactured and installed by the tenant after the building was completed, although to remove it requires the tearing away of parts of partition walls that were taken out in order to receive it, where no material injury to the building would ensue; and the same is true of other fittings the removal of which would work no material injury to the building.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the superior court for Spokane county, Blake, J., entered August 11, 1915, vacating a judgment upon an arbitration and award, after a hearing before the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Card, J., entered December 2é, 1915, in favor of the defendants, in an action to enjoin the collection of a tax, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Mines and Minerals — Lease—Right to Lease — Commissioner of Public Lands — Powers. Rem. 1915 Code, § 6791, providing for the leasing of state lands for the purpose of mining and extraction of petroleum and gas, leaves no discretion in the commissioner of public lands where a qualified person has complied with the provisions of the statute.</p> <p>Same — Lease—Powers of Commissioner — “Lands Belonging to State.” Rem. 1915 Code, § 6791, providing for the leasing of “any land belonging to the state” for the purpose of mining and extraction of petroleum and gas, applies to lands which have been sold by the state, under Id., § 6675, reserving to the state all oils, gases, and minerals and the right to enter for the purpose of taking the same.</p> <p>Same — Lease—Right to Lease — Conditions Precedent. Under Rem. 1915 Code, § 6675, reserving to the state, its successors and assigns, all oils, gases and minerals on lands sold by the state, with the right to enter for the purpose of taking the same, with the proviso that the state’s reserved rights shall not be exercised until provision has been made by the state, its successors or assigns, to pay to the owner of the land full damages sustained by reason of the entry, an applicant of an oil lease of state lands must show that provision has been made to pay to a contracting purchaser from the state the damages that he will sustain by reason of the entry, as such person is the “owner” within the meaning of the act.</p>

<p>Appeal — Review—Harmless Error — Instructions. It is not reversible error to refuse requested instructions that are merely a specific elaboration of more general instructions referring to the issues to be determined, where, upon the whole, the case was fairly submitted to the jury.</p>

<p>Interest — Allowance — Unliquidated Claims — Oten Account. An unliquidated demand upon an open account for advances made in the nature of loans, draws interest where the amount can be ascertained by a mere computation; and the claim should be treated as liquidated from the time when its certainty is ascertainable.</p>

, entered September 11, 1914, in favor of the plaintiff, in an action to quiet title to waters for irrigation, tried to the court.

<p>Limitation oe Actions — Form oe Action — Relief on Ground of Fraud —- Trespass —• Accrual. An action to recover damages for wrongful entry upon a mining claim and the removal of ore from plaintiff’s lands through defendants’ underground workings, which was not discoverable at the time, is not an action for relief upon the ground of fraud, under Rem. Code, § 159, providing that such an action shall not be deemed to have accrued until three years after the discovery of the fraud, but an action of trespass that is barred by Id., § 155, after three years.</p>

, entered October 8, 1915, upon findings in favor of tbe plaintiffs, in an action for damages to property, tried to tbe court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of tbe superior court for King county, Ronald, J., entered December 14, 1915, upon findings in favor of tbe plaintiff, in an action to cancel a tax, tried to tbe court.</p>

<p>Motion to dismiss an appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Lincoln county, Sessions, J., entered June 17, 1916.</p>

<p>Motion to dismiss an appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Blake, J., entered March 16, 1916.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Huneke, J., entered October 25, 1915, upon findings in favor of the defendant, in an action for damages, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Kitsap county, Dykeman, J., entered November 24, 1915, dismissing an action for equitable relief, after a trial to the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Walla Walla county, McCroskey, J., entered June 7, 1915, allowing an administrator’s final account, on objections by the sole heir.</p>

, entered February 15, 1916, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, dismissing an action for damages for trespass.