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← 93 Wash. 2d 268 - State v. Dupard

93 Wash. 2d 268 - State v. Dupard’s Empirical Analysis

1980

Citation profile

118
cited by 118 later decisions
13
states following
October 2019
most recently cited

114 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 118 later decisions — most recently October 2019 · most notably 51 Cal. 3d 335 - Lucido v. Superior Court (1990), 171 W. Va. 584 - Conley v. Spillers (1983)

114 state decisions — followed in 13 states

5601980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Morrissey v. Brewer · Ashe v. Swenson · United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co. · McGautha v. California · Sealfon v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 118 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"(1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in the second action; (2) the prior adjudication must have ended in a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with the party to the prior adjudication; and (4) application of the doctrine does not work an injustice."”
    7 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “is more appropriately addressed to the criminal justice system.”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “Policy arguments have been often the deciding factor when collateral estoppel is based upon prior administrative determination. 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise sec. 18.04 (1958 and Supp. 1970). The doctrine may be qualified or rejected when its application would contravene public policy. See, e.g., Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir.1971). We believe public policy dictates rejection of collateral estoppel in this instance. Parole revocation is not part of a new criminal prosecution. Standlee v. Smith, 83 Wash.2d 405 , 518 P.2d 721 (1974). See also Standlee v. Rhay, 403 F.Supp. 1247 (E.D.Wash.1975), rev’d 557 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir.1977). Rather, it is a “continuing consequence” of the original conviction. (Emphasis in original) The parole revocation process has been described as a two-fold inquiry. The first involves “a wholly retrospective factual question”: has the parolee in fact violated a condition of parole? Assuming an affirmative answer, the second step addresses the appropriate disposition of the matter. In re Abridge, supra, 90 Wash.2d [350] at 351, 581 P.2d 1050 [(1978)]. In the instant case, the basic factual question to be answered is whether the parolee in fact committed a new crime. As a general proposition, we believe this inquiry is more appropriately addressed to the criminal justice system. See United States ex rel. Burgess v. Lindsey, 395 F.Supp. 404, 410 (E.D.Pa.1975). ###**»⅜ Practical public policy requires that new crimina”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.