¶1OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
¶2A jury convicted appellant of driving while intoxicated. The court of appeals affirmed that conviction. Fox v. State, 900 S.W.2d 345 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1995). We granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review ostensibly to address the issue of whether, under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, there exists a so-called “community caretaking function” exception to the requirement that a temporary detention be justified by reasonable suspicion. At the time we granted appellant’s petition we had already granted another petition for discretionary review in which cause the court of appeals had explicitly written on the “community caretaking function” issue. Rheinlander v. State, 888 S.W.2d 917 (Tex.App.— Austin 1994). But Rheinlander died before this Court could write on the issue, and his petition was dismissed and his appeal permanently abated. Rheinlander v. State, 918 S.W.2d 527 (Tex.Cr.App.1996).
¶3Upon closer scrutiny in the instant cause, it is apparent that the court below was not presented with, and did not address, the “community caretaking function” question. This Court reviews “decisions” of the courts of appeals; as a general rule, we do not reach the merits of any party’s contention when it has not been addressed by the lower appellate court. Lee v. State, 791 S.W.2d 141 (Tex.Cr.App.1990). Accordingly, we now find that our decision to grant appellant’s petition for discretionary review was improvident. Appellant’s petition for discretionary review is dismissed. Tex.R.App.Pro. 202(k).
¶4concurring.
¶5Appellant’s conviction and sentence for driving while intoxicated were affirmed by *608the court of appeals. Fox v. State, 900 S.W.2d 345 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995). The majority found the acts of appellant (which included erratic speed and weaving within his lane of traffic) were sufficient to create reasonable suspicion on the part of the police officer that something out of the ordinary was occurring or had occurred connecting appellant with a possible crime. Fox, supra, at 347, citing Stone v. State, 703 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). See also, Viveros v. State, 828 S.W.2d 2, 4 (Tex. Crim.App.1991).
¶6The trial court found, and the court of appeals agreed, that appellant’s weaving and fluctuating speed within his lane were actions creating “suspicion for me to stop it.” The record demonstrates the court of appeals gave proper deference to the findings of fact by the trial court, Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), and correctly limited its review to the trial court’s application of the law to the facts.
¶7This Court granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to consider the following ground for review: “Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence based on an illegal stop?”
¶8We have held that we will not, in effect, “second guess” a judgment of the court of appeals, where “it fairly addresses the issues raised on appeal, evaluates those issues according to settled rules of law, accounts for all evidence relevant to the questions presented, and reaches a conclusion adequately supported by the law and the evidence.” Ardia v. State, 834 S.W.2d 357, 361 (Tex.Crim. App.1992). I am unable to find anything in the record to indicate the court of appeals’ judgment was based on an erroneous interpretation of the law or that it is not supported by the evidence. Accordingly, I agree to the dismissal of this cause as having been improvidently granted and join in the judgment of the court.