State v. Holmes’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

21 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “|4To suppress an identification, a defendant must first prove that the identification procedure was suggestive. State v. Prudholm, 446 So.2d 729, 738 (La.1984). An identification procedure is suggestive if, during the procedure, the witness’ attention is unduly focused on the defendant. State v. Robinson, 386 So.2d 1374, 1377 (La.1980). Moreover, a defendant who seeks to suppress an identification must prove both that the identification itself was suggestive and that a likelihood of misidentification existed as a result of the identification procedure. State v. Valentine, 570 So.2d 533 (La.App. 4 Cir.1990). The [Louisiana] Supreme Court has held that even if the identification could be considered suggestive, it is the likelihood of misidentification that violates due process, not merely the suggestive identification procedure. State v. Thibodeaux, 98-1673 (La.9/8/99); 750 So.2d 916, 932 . Fairness is the standard of review for identification procedures, and reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977). Even a suggestive, out-of-court identification will be admissible if it is found reliable under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Guy, 95-0899 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/31/96) , 669 So.2d 517 . If a suggestive identification procedure has been proved, a reviewing court must look to several factors to determine, from the totality of the circumstances, wh”

   8 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State Ex Rel. Jn · 123 So. 3d 320 - State v. Quinn

2. “When a key issue at trial is whether the defendant was the perpetrator of the crime, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification in order to carry its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bright, XXXX-XXXX (La.4/11/00); 776 So.2d 1134, 1147 . The fact-finder weighs the respective credibilities of the witnesses, and a reviewing court will generally not second-guess those determinations. State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983). However, the touchstone of Jackson v. Virginia is rationality and that "irrational decisions to convict will be overturned, rational decisions to convict will be upheld, and the actual fact finder's discretion will be impinged upon only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law." State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1310 (La.1988). The trier of fact makes credibility determinations, and may, within the bounds of rationality, accept or reject the testimony of any witnesses. State v. Hampton, 98-0331 (La.4/23/99); 750 So.2d 867, 880 .”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Bedou · 123 So. 3d 307 - State v. Peters

3. “When a key issue at trial whether the defendant was the perpetrator of the crime, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification in order to carry its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Williams