¶2As the majority holds, the plain reading of § 15-18-8, Ala. Code 1975, requires the conclusion that " § 15-18-8(c) plainly authorizes a trial court to suspend `the minimum sentence' required to be imposed by § 15-18-8(a), including `the minimum period of confinement' that § 15-18-8(a)(1) requires for sentences greater than 15 years but not more than 20 years."932 So.2d at 133. I do not believe that when the legislature amended § 15-18-8 in 2000 it contemplated or intended this result; I agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that this interpretation essentially renders "the 2000 amendment devoid of any field of operation and utterly meaningless." State v. Gaines,932 So.2d 118, 123 (Ala.Crim.App. 2004) (footnote omitted). However, this Court is bound by the rules of statutory construction, and today's interpretation of the statute properly applies those rules.
932 So. 2d 124
Ex Parte McCormick
Decided November 23, 2005
Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 2005-11-23
Cited by 24 later decisions — most recently October 2016
24 state decisions
Key passage — most relied on by later courts
““We conclude, therefore, that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that the legislative history of the Act and the fact that the Act was inconsistent with § 15-22-50, Ala. Code 1975, require a departure from the plain language of § 15-18-8(c). Instead, it is rational to interpret the grant of authority in § 15-18-8(c) to trial courts ‘to suspend that portion of the minimum sentence that remains [under § 15-18-8(a) ] and place the defendant on probation’ as including the "authority to suspend the 3-year minimum term of confinement required by § 15-18-8(a)(l) for sentences of more than 15 years but not more than 20 years.””
quoted by 1 later decision, including Williams v. State
Relies on Ex Parte State
Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know
Decided 2005-11-23
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