Baker v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “' "The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused-whose life or liberty is at stake-is without counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused. While an accused may waive the right to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear upon the record.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Woodruff v. City of Pelham · Thomas v. State

2. “' ".... " ' "Although the Supreme Court in Faretta states that a defendant should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, the Supreme Court does not require a specific colloquy between the trial judge and the defendant. 'The case law reflects that, while a waiver hearing expressly addressing the disadvantage of a pro se defense is much to be preferred, it is not absolutely necessary. The ultimate test is not the trial court's express advice but rather the defendant's understanding.' Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright , 800 F.2d 1057 (11th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). In each case the court needs to look to the particular facts and circumstances involved, 'including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.' Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458 , 464, [ 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 ] (1938). " ' "This court looks to a totality of the circumstances involved in determining whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Jenkins v. State , 482 So.2d 1315 (Ala. Cr. App. 1985) ; King v. State , 55 Ala. App. 306 , 314 So.2d 908 (Ala. Cr. App. 1975), cert. denied; Ex parte King , 294 Ala. 762 , 314 So.2d 912 (1975).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Kennedy v. State · Flagg v. State

3. “' Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458 , 465 (1938). " '.... " 'Certainly, the provisions of Rule 6.1(b) are mandatory, and, if a defendant properly preserves and presents an argument on appeal that the trial court faltered in its application of the mandatory provisions of Rule 6.1(b), he is entitled to relief. See , e.g. , Ex parte King , 797 So.2d 1191 (Ala. 2001). However, the fact that a trial court forgoes those provisions does not necessarily indicate that a defendant unknowingly, unintelligently, and involuntarily has waived his right to counsel. That is, the fact that a trial court fails to abide by the letter of Rule 6.1(b) and Faretta [v. California , 422 U.S. 806 (1975),] does not necessarily result in the defendant's being deprived of counsel and, thus, the trial court's being jurisdictionally barred from rendering a judgment. See Tomlin v. State , 601 So.2d 124 , 128 (Ala. 1991) ("Although the Supreme Court in Faretta states that a defendant should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, the Supreme Court does not require a specific colloquy between the trial judge and the defendant.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Kennedy v. State · Woodruff v. City of Pelham