¶1specially concurring.
¶2I fully concur with the result reached here by the majority. I write specially however, because of my prior participation as a member of the division in People v. Parrish, 879 P.2d 453 (Colo.App.1994), and the later addition to the pertinent statute of a general definition of “mental disease or defect.” Section 16-8-102(4.7), C.R.S. (1995 Cum.Supp.).
¶3The opinion in Parrishequated the term, “abnormal mental condition,” as used in the substantive statute, § 16-8-120(4), C.R.S. (1986 RepLVol. 8A), with the term “mental disease or defect,” as used in § 16-8-102(4), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A), which defines the term, “ineligible for release.” At the time that the Parrishopinion was issued, however, there was no general statutory definition of “mental disease or defect;” the only definition of this term was contained in § 16-8-102(2.7), C.R.S. (1986 RepLVol. 8A), which, by its specific terms, was limited to those instances in which the question was presented whether a defendant was suffering from an “impaired mental condition,” so as to render the person incapable of forming the requisite specific intent. See § 16-8-103.5, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A). Parrish, therefore, did not equate the “abnormal mental condition” referred to in the release statute, § 16-8-120(4), with this statutory definition.
¶4As the majority opinion and the Tenth Circuit in Parrish v. Colorado, 78 F.3d 1473 (10th Cir.1996) recognize, all of these statutory terms, like the term, “insanity,” incorporate legal, not medical, concepts. It is, therefore, irrelevant whether the statutory definitions of these terms are consistent with the medical profession’s definitions. The question simply is: what condition must be shown to exist in order to render a person previously acquitted of a crime because of insanity ineligible to be released from his or her forced hospitalization.
¶5In 1995, the General Assembly provided, for the first time, a general definition of the term, “mental disease or defect.” Colo. Sess. Laws 1995, ch. 26, § 16-8-102(4.7) at 72. Under this statute, the term is defined as a “severely abnormal mental condition[] that grossly and demonstrably impair[s] a person’s perceptions or understanding of reality,” not attributable to the use of alcohol or other psychoactive substances. The term does not include “abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.” Section 16-8-102(4.7), C.R.S. (1995 Cum.Supp.)
¶6In this same general definitional statute, the term “ineligible for release” is still said to mean that the defendant is suffering “from a mental disease or defect,” § 16-8-102(4), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A), and nothing in this latter sub-section suggests to me that this term carries a meaning different from the new definition in § 16-8-102(4.7). Section 16-8-102 does note that these definitions are to be applied, “unless the context otherwise requires.”
¶7However, § 16-8-120(4), C.R.S. (1995 Cum.Supp.) establishes a specific requirement for the release of a person charged with a crime allegedly occurring between July 1, 1983 and July 1, 1995. That requirement is: “That the defendant has no abnormal mental condition which would be likely to cause the defendant to be dangerous either to himself or herself or to others or to the community in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
¶8Because of the specific elements of the test required to be employed under § 16-8-120(4), I am convinced that, when the General Assembly used the term “abnormal mental condition,” it did so deliberately and that it did not mean to require a showing that the defendant suffered from a “mental disease or defect” as defined under § 16-8-102(4.7), which requires proof of a “severely ” abnormal condition and a gross impairment of the perception of reality.
¶9I agree that such an interpretation of § 16-8-120(4) creates some conflict with the definition of “ineligible for release” under § 16-8-102(4). However, because this latter term is merely definitional, and is not to be applied if the context requires another meaning, and because § 16-8-120(4) is the specific, substantive, statute, the former definition must yield to the latter. See Pima Financial Service Corp. v. Selby, 820 P.2d 1124 (Colo.App.1991).
¶10Here, for example, while all of the experts agreed that defendant suffered from an “ab*31normal mental condition,” there was no proof that defendant’s perception of reality was grossly impaired. If proof of such gross impairment is required, as it would be if it were concluded that the existence of the condition described in § 16-8-102(4.7) must be shown, we could not, based on this record, affirm the trial court’s refusal to release defendant.
¶11I am convinced, however, that the statute, properly construed, requires no such proof. It is sufficient under the statute if it is demonstrated that the detainee is suffering from an abnormal mental condition, albeit less severe than that described in § 16-8-102(4.7), that renders him dangerous.
¶12Nor does this interpretation cause the statute to run afoul of the principle established in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992). There, the court invalidated a statute that allowed a person previously acquitted because of ins an- • ity to continue to be confined in a mental institution simply upon proof that that person continued to be a danger to himself or herself or to others; it was not necessary under that statute to prove either that the person was still “insane” or that he or she suffered from any mental disorder of any type. But, while the Supreme Court determined that continued hospitalization could be constitutionally justified only by proof of a continuing mental problem, it was not precise as to the nature of the disorder that was required, as the division in Parrish noted.
¶13I conclude, therefore, that “abnormal mental condition” as used in § 16-8-120(3) refers to a condition that may not be classified by the medical profession as a “disease” or a “defect” and that may also not be a “disease or defect” under the statutory definition of those terms. Nevertheless, the existence of such less severe condition, which renders the person dangerous, makes the individual ineligible for release under the statute and satisfies the Foucharequirement, at least if, as here, the record supports the finding that such condition is treatable.