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935 So. 2d 592

Docket No. 1D05-0976.

Terrell v. Thompson

Barbara TERRELL, Appellant, v. Kay THOMPSON, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 2006-08-08

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently April 2011

6 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“any assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, or false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death, by a person against any other person.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 975 So. 2d 500 - Smith v. Melcher

Relies on 857 So. 2d 353 - Perez v. Siegel · Forrest v. Wilson

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2006-08-08

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*593 Christopher T. Wilson, Esquire of the Law Office of Gary Baker, P.A., Callahan, for Appellant.

¶2Kay Thompson, pro se, Appellee.

¶3PER CURIAM.

¶4Barbara Terrell appeals from a Final Judgment of Injunction for Protection Against Repeat Violence entered against her. We reverse because no competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's ruling.

¶5To enter an injunction for "repeat violence," the trial court must find that there were "two incidents of violence or stalking committed by the respondent." § 784.046(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004). "Violence" is defined to include "assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, or false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death, by a person against any other person." § 784.046(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). Competent, substantial evidence must support the trial court's findings of two incidents of repeat violence. See Forrest v. Wilson,889 So.2d 124, 124-25 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

¶6We reverse the judgment entering the injunction in the present case because competent, substantial evidence does not support the finding of even a single act of violence (as defined by the statute) perpetrated by the appellant. See Perez v. Siegel,857 So.2d 353, 354-55 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (explaining that verbal threats without an overt act creating a well-founded fear that violence was imminent were insufficient to qualify as assault under the statute).

¶7Reversed.

¶8ERVIN, BENTON, and BROWNING, JJ., concur.

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