936 F2d 579 Seagrave v. Lake County
936 F.2d 579
Unpublished Disposition
NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Harry James SEAGRAVE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LAKE COUNTY, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 89-16553.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted June 10, 1991.*
Decided June 24, 1991.
Before HUG, SCHROEDER and WIGGINS, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM**
Appellant Harry Seagrave ("Seagrave"), a California state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court's order dismissing his section 1983 complaint and his petition for writ of habeas corpus and the order denying his post-judgment motion. Seagrave brought a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against the Lake County Sheriff's Department and certain named defendants, alleging that he was denied due process, subjected to cruel and unusual punishment and denied effective assistance of counsel because he was shackled during trial. The district court found that Seagrave's allegations also challenged the legality of his confinement. Therefore, the court construed the complaint as both a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a section 1983 complaint.
The district court dismissed Seagrave's habeas corpus action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court also dismissed Seagrave's section 1983 claim for failure to state a constitutional claim and because the sheriff responsible for the shackling was protected by derivative immunity. The district court's dismissal of Seagrave's section 1983 action was pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d) (court may dismiss the case if satisfied the action is frivolous). Subsequently, Seagrave filed a timely motion to vacate the judgment. This motion was denied. Seagrave filed a timely appeal from the district court's dismissal of his section 1983 action and habeas action and the order denying his post-judgment motion.
We have jurisdiction to hear this case under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. The decision whether to grant or deny a petition for habeas corpus is reviewed de novo. Norris v. Risley, 878 F.2d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir.1989). This court also reviews de novo the district court's dismissal of an action as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d). Jackson v. State of Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.1989).
On appeal, Seagrave alleges that he has "exhausted all state remedies by way of direct appeal, Petition for Review and Supplementary Petition for Review/Habeas, with no further recourse to the state courts whatsoever." Normally, our court has discretion to grant habeas relief if the state remedies are exhausted by the time we act, even if the remedies were not exhausted when the habeas corpus petition was filed. See Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir.1988). In this case, however, the facts are not adequately developed on appeal. For example, it is critical to the determination of Seagrave's alleged Fourteenth Amendment violation whether he appeared before a jury while restrained with leg-irons. Also, it is important to know the specific facts relating to Seagrave's allegations that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because he was unable to take notes, review documents and effectively cross-examine the complaining witness due to the imposed physical restraints. Moreover, it is unclear from the record whether Seagrave has actually exhausted his state remedies.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court's dismissal of Seagrave's petition for writ of habeas corpus for failure to exhaust state remedies. If Seagrave's allegations of exhaustion are accurate, the district court must determine whether Seagrave's factual allegations state a claim and whether an evidentiary hearing must be held in order to determine the merits of Seagrave's claim. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-13 (1963).
We also reverse the district court's dismissal of Seagrave's section 1983 complaint. In this circuit, a section 1983 action that requires as its predicate a determination that a sentence currently being served is invalid or unconstitutionally long must be stayed pending exhaustion of state remedies. See Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 876-78 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1090 (1991). In this case, Seagrave's section 1983 action should have been stayed pending exhaustion of state remedies. Thus, his section 1983 complaint must be reinstated.
Accordingly, the decision of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.