Glick v. McKay’s Empirical Analysis
937 F.2d 434 · 1991
Citation profile
17 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 30 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently July 2017 · most notably Mai Systems Corporation v. Peak Computer Inc Mai Systems Corporation (1993), Lambert v. Wicklund (1997)
17 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 1988
Relies on Roe v. Wade · Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth · Bellotti v. Baird · City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. · Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[The bypass provision] provides that in a summary proceeding, “[t]he court shall render its decision as soon as practicable after the conclusion of the trial of a summary proceeding and, whenever practicable, without taking the matter under advisement.” Such an open-ended bypass procedure has never been approved. We should not, as the Supreme Court has suggested, “invalidate [a bypass] statute on a facial challenge based upon a worst-case analysis that may never occur.” ... An indefinite period, however, has been rejected.... [The bypass procedures] plainly conflict with Bellotti II because the juvenile court is not required to rule on the minor’s application within any specified time nor are state counselors required to report back to the juvenile court within any specified time. We hold that “whenever practicable” does not satisfy constitutional standards of expediency. There is no fallback (or constructive authorization) provision within [the bypass procedure] that deems a minor’s application granted in the event the juvenile court does not act within a particular time frame. Thus, not only do [the bypass procedures] fail to provide any specific time within which a minor’s application will be decided, but they give no assurances (assurances required by Bellotti II) that the proceedings will conclude expeditiously.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“the facts are established or of no controlling relevance.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“1.) The procedure must allow the minor to show that she possesses the maturity and information to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, without regard to her parents’ wishes”; 2.) The procedure must allow the minor to show that, even if she cannot make the abortion decision by herself, the desired abortion would be in her best interest; 3.) The procedure must ensure the minor’s anonymity; and 4.) The courts must conduct a bypass procedure with expediency to allow the minor an effective opportunity to obtain the abortion.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.