937 So. 2d 1065 - Scott v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

15 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Scott next argues that the trial court erred when it failed to sever the capital-murder charges involving Latonya Sager from rape and attempted-murder charges involving Landris Wright. He claims that the charges were improperly joined for trial and that he was prejudiced as a result of having to defend against the multiple charges in a single trial. "Scott was charged in three indictments. One indictment charged two counts of capital murder for the death of Latonya Sager-one count for the intentional murder of a child under the age of 14 years and one count for intentional murder during the course of, or during an attempt to commit, rape. In a second indictment, Scott was charged with one count of rape and one count of attempted murder for his assault on Landris Wright. The third indictment charged him with burglary for Scott's unauthorized entry into Gladys Smith's residence. On July 28, 2000, the State filed a motion pursuant to Rule 13, Ala.R.Crim.P., seeking consolidation of the offenses. The State argued that the actions were part of a common plan or scheme, that they were connected, and that they were of the same or similar character. (C. 466-67.) The trial court granted the motion. On the morning of trial, Scott objected to the consolidation of the cases and requested that the trial court sever the capital charges from the noncapital charges. (R. 97.) 3 The trial court stated that the cases would remain consolidated for trial. "Joinder of offenses is governed by Rule ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Scott v. State

2. “"In a listing of mitigating circumstances the court found not to exist, the court included, `Any other mitigating circumstance offered pursuant to § 13A-5-52, Code of Alabama 1975.' (C. 77.) In the next paragraph of the sentencing order, however, the court stated, `The Court considered the evidence presented by the defendant as evidence of non-statutory mitigating factors.' (C. 77.) Although the trial court need not list and make findings as to each item of alleged nonstatutory mitigating evidence offered by a defendant, Reeves v. State, 807 So.2d 18, 48 (Ala.Crim.App.2000), it must make a clear finding regarding the existence or nonexistence of nonstatutory mitigating evidence offered by a defendant. § 13A-5-47(d), Ala.Code 1975. The sentencing order is unclear as to whether the court found any nonstatutory mitigating circumstances to exist. On remand, this ambiguity must be clarified."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Woods v. State

3. “"`"A motion for a continuance is addressed to the discretion of the court and the court's ruling on it will not be disturbed unless there is an abuse of discretion. Fletcher v. State , 291 Ala. 67 , 277 So.2d 882 (1973). If the following principles are satisfied, a trial court should grant a motion for continuance on the ground that a witness or evidence is absent: (1) the expected evidence must be material and competent; (2) there must be a probability that the evidence will be forthcoming if the case is continued; and (3) the moving party must have exercised due diligence to secure the evidence. Knowles v. Blue , 209 Ala. 27 , 32 , 95 So. 481 , 485-86 (1923)."' " Fortenberry v. State , 545 So.2d 129 , 138 (Ala.Crim.App. 1988)."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 992 So. 2d 64 - Eatmon v. State